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 2191 
UNSPORTSMANLIKE CONDUCT: AN 
ANALYSIS OF THE NFL’S EXPANSION 
POLICY UNDER U.S. ANTITRUST LAW 
Abstract: The National Football League (NFL) has a policy for admitting expan-
sion franchises that conditions admission on the affirmative vote of three-fourths 
of current member teams. Limitations on the number of franchises allow a small 
group to control the provision of professional football, and every element there-
of—from prices of tickets and concessions to the quality of the overall experi-
ence. The United States’ antitrust law restricts conduct, by agreement or monopo-
lization, that has the effect of restricting trade to the detriment of consumers. This 
Note discusses the antitrust setting in which the NFL’s expansion policy exists 
and the foundational legislation. The Note goes on to apply current antitrust law 
to the NFL’s expansion policy to determine whether there should be concerns 
about liability. In suggesting that, yes, the NFL expansion policy is anticompeti-
tive to the detriment of consumers, this Note endorses the theory of parallel ex-
clusion as a beneficial addition to antitrust analyses. 
INTRODUCTION 
The New England Patriots have sold out every home game since 1994.1 
The Green Bay Packers’ sellout streak goes back to 1959.2 The Cincinnati 
Bengals drew the lightest crowd per regular season home game in 2018, with a 
crowd of nearly fifty-one thousand fans, while each team in the top half of 
NFL attendance was able to fill at least 65,800 seats per game during the same 
stretch.3 In a league of thirty-two teams, the Buffalo Bills and the Dallas Cow-
                                                                                                                           
 1 Mark Daniels, Patriots: Sellout Streak Continues for 24th Consecutive Season, TELEGRAM 
(July 14, 2017), https://www.telegram.com/sports/20170714/patriots-sellout-streak-continues-for-
24th-consecutive-season [https://perma.cc/5MFA-P6H6]. 
 2 Id. Although a team’s report that a game has “sold out” does not necessarily mean that every 
seat is occupied at game time, it typically does suggest that a ticket for each seat has been sold. See 
Maury Brown, How Sports Attendance Figures Speak Lies, FORBES (May 25, 2011), https://www.
forbes.com/sites/sportsmoney/2011/05/25/how-sports-attendance-figures-speak-lies/#16b4645a2b2a 
[https://perma.cc/K2TE-9XPS]. 
 3 See National Football League: Total Regular Season Home Attendance by Team in 2018, STATIS-
TA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/249368/regular-season-home-attendance-of-nfl-teams/ [https://
perma.cc/UGK4-WR4G] (providing the total regular season home game attendance per team in 2018). 
This calculation did not consider the Los Angeles Chargers, who drew significantly fewer attendees in 
their temporary location. Id. The Chargers averaged nearly thirty-three thousand fans per game. See 
Cameron DaSilva, The Chargers’ Temporary L.A. Stadium Will Be the NFL’s Smallest by Far, FOX 
SPORTS (Jan. 13, 2017), https://www.foxsports.com/nfl/story/san-diego-chargers-los-angeles-move-
stadium-stubhub-center-size-capacity-011217 [https://perma.cc/7ABW-8432] (identifying the Stub-
Hub Center as the Chargers’ temporary home stadium and noting the thirty-thousand-seat capacity). 
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boys are the least and most valuable NFL franchises as of 2018, valued at ap-
proximately $1.6 billion and $5 billion, respectively.4 These valuations suggest 
that every franchise in the NFL is successful, and beg the question: why are 
there only thirty-two teams in such a lucrative market?5 
Article III of the Constitution and Bylaws of the NFL (NFL Constitution) 
requires a positive vote of at least three-fourths of the then members of the 
league to approve any admission of a new NFL franchise.6 Under the current 
rule, a faction of any nine owners has the power to prevent the expansion of 
the league, independent of the reasonableness of adding a new franchise to the 
league or petitioning region.7 As written, Article III of the NFL Constitution 
implicates U.S. antitrust laws, because it presents an opportunity for league 
owners to coordinate to exclude new franchises, thus limiting competition.8 
Moreover, the structure of the league suggests that it may be in each owner’s 
best interest to do so.9 
Part I of this Note provides a brief overview of antitrust law in the United 
States, discusses its application to professional sports leagues, and introduces 
cases examining the legality of NFL expansion and relocation rules.10 Part II 
synthesizes the presented case law and explores what conduct under the NFL’s 
                                                                                                                           
 4 Franchise Value of National Football League Teams in 2018 (in Million U.S. Dollars), STATIS-
TA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/193534/franchise-value-of-national-football-league-teams-in-
2010/ [https://perma.cc/US9P-BXDV]. 
 5 See Teams, NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, https://www.nfl.com/teams [https://perma.cc/RUG5-
575S] (listing the current thirty-two National Football League (NFL) franchises). Of the fifty largest 
metropolitan areas within the United States, nineteen do not currently have NFL franchises or plans 
for a franchise to relocate there. See Chris Burke, Building an NFL Expansion Team, SPORTS ILLUS-
TRATED (Aug. 22, 2017), https://www.si.com/nfl/2017/08/22/nfl-expansion-team-draft-keepers-cities-
coaches [https://perma.cc/MF6W-YL4L] (identifying nine cities in the United States, Canada, and 
Mexico that have potential to be home to NFL expansion franchises); Population of the Largest Met-
ropolitan Areas in the U.S. as of 2017 (in 1,000), STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/
183600/population-of-metropolitan-areas-in-the-us/ [https://perma.cc/75H6-RLZU] (providing the 
fifty largest metropolitan areas in the United States by population); Report: Raiders Won’t Move to 
Vegas Before 2020, REUTERS (Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-football-nfl-oak-
raiders-vegas/report-raiders-wont-move-to-vegas-before-2020-idUSKCN1MF0CP [https://perma.
cc/7CYC-2ZXD] (discussing the Oakland Raiders’ plans to relocate to Las Vegas, Nevada). 
 6 NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS OF THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL 
LEAGUE art. III §§ 3.1–.3 (2006), https://onlabor.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/co_.pdf [https://
perma.cc/R3JP-84DJ] [hereinafter NFL CONST.].  
 7 See L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 726 F.2d 1381,1397 (9th Cir. 
1984) (noting that the NFL’s relocation rule, which also requires a three-fourths vote, allows unrea-
sonable restriction by existing franchises); NFL CONST., supra note 6, at art. III § 3.3(C) (requiring 
twenty-four votes under the current league structure to pass a vote on expansion). 
 8 See Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2018) (making agreements between parties that 
have the effect of restricting competition illegal); L.A. Mem’l Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1392 (noting the 
effects of agreements among competitors as limiting market forces to allow unreasonable prices); 
NFL CONST., supra note 6, at art. III (providing the NFL rule for adding expansion franchises). 
 9 See generally C. Scott Hemphill & Tim Wu, Parallel Exclusion, 122 YALE L.J. 1182 (2013) 
(discussing parallel exclusion as a violation of antitrust laws). 
 10 See infra notes 13–142 and accompanying text. 
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expansion rules could violate antitrust law.11 Part III then argues that Congress 
should recognize parallel exclusion as a violation of antitrust law and that the 
NFL expansion rules, as written, are unreasonable restraints on competition.12 
I. AN OVERVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAW AS APPLIED TO  
COMPETITIVE SPORT LEAGUES 
Antitrust laws have a long history of application in the United States, with 
the overarching goal of restricting anticompetitive behavior and practices for 
the benefit and protection of consumers.13 Due to the structure of competitive 
sports leagues in the United States, including the NFL, it has not always been 
clear how antitrust laws should be applied.14 Although recent years have clari-
fied how an antitrust challenge to the NFL should be analyzed, certain aspects 
of the NFL’s policies and behavior have not been challenged in the courts.15 
Section A of this Part provides a brief overview of the antitrust laws in place in 
the United States.16 Section B introduces parallel exclusion as a theorized vio-
lation of the Sherman Act.17 Section C presents existing wrinkles in antitrust 
law relating to professional sports leagues and their application as a defense 
against antitrust challenges.18 Section D provides a history of the NFL as an 
entity, describes the current rules of the NFL surrounding expansion, and de-
tails the most recent expansions of the league.19 Finally, Section E discusses 
                                                                                                                           
 11 See infra notes 143–203 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra notes 204–226 and accompanying text. 
 13 See H.R. REP. NO. 51-1707, at 1 (1890) (identifying the objectives of the Sherman Act); Elea-
nor M. Fox, The Politics of Law and Economics in Judicial Decision Making: Antitrust as a Window, 
61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 554, 566–67 (1986) (discussing the Supreme Court’s description of the rationales 
for antitrust laws in the United States); The Antitrust Laws, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (2019), https://
www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws [https://perma.cc/
8LUN-9KZA] (identifying the consistent purpose of antitrust laws in the United States as protecting 
competition in the interest of consumers). 
 14 See Daniel E. Lazaroff, The Antitrust Implications of Franchise Relocation Restrictions in 
Professional Sports, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 157, 167 (1984) (comparing sports leagues in the United 
States to a parent/subsidiary relationship). Because sports leagues are typically composed of individu-
ally-owned corporate entities, the structure of leagues and their member teams does not directly paral-
lel other corporate structures that courts have identified as posing a risk for anticompetitive behavior. 
Id. 
 15 See Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 204 (2010) (examining whether 
NFL teams form a single entity for the purposes of antitrust analysis in the negative). Although the 
NFL has been challenged for its relocation and expansionary policies relating to open markets, the 
courts have not heard a legal challenge relating to a proposed expansion into a market where an NFL 
team already resides. See L.A. Mem’l Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1381 (challenging the NFL’s relocation 
policy); Mid-S. Grizzlies v. Nat’l Football League, 720 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1983) (challenging the 
NFL’s denial of a franchise to a team in the Memphis market). 
 16 See infra notes 21–53 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 54–72 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 73–85 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 86–103 and accompanying text. 
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the application of general antitrust laws to the NFL to establish the baseline 
from which future challenges should begin.20 
A. Antitrust Laws in the United States 
There are two major pieces of legislation in the United States concerning 
anticompetitive behaviors in the marketplace: the Sherman Act and the Clay-
ton Act.21 The Sherman Act was the initial piece of legislation, passed into law 
in 1890.22 The Clayton Act followed in 1914 and expanded the scope of anti-
trust protection.23 Subsection 1 of this Section describes the formation of the 
Sherman Act, relevant components of the Act, and tests for application of the 
Act.24 Subsection 2 provides a brief discussion of the Clayton Act, as it forms 
one of the two pillars of antitrust legislation in the United States.25 
1. The Sherman Act 
The Sherman Act was a statutory creation that was passed following the 
Industrial Revolution.26 The main goal of the Act was to prevent newly estab-
lished trusts, monopolies, and other anticompetitive behavior from restricting 
commerce in the United States.27 Although the protection of the Sherman Act 
focused on smaller participants in the marketplace that were being forced out 
due to the presence of the larger trusts, the net impact of the legislation also 
benefited consumers.28 
                                                                                                                           
 20 See infra notes 104–142 and accompanying text. 
 21 See Fox, supra note 13, at 563–65 (detailing the stages of antitrust legislation in the United 
States). See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7; Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27. 
 22 Fox, supra note 13, at 563. 
 23 See id. at 563–64 (discussing the motivation behind the passage of the Clayton Antitrust Act). 
Whereas the Sherman Act makes conduct such as contracting or conspiring that restricts competition 
illegal, the Clayton Antitrust Act targets activities that do not by their nature restrict competition, but 
have an anticompetitive net effect. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7, 12–27; see Fox, supra note 13, at 564 (providing 
historical context for the Clayton Act).  
 24 See infra notes 26–50 and accompanying text. 
 25 See infra notes 51–53 and accompanying text. 
 26 See Fox, supra note 13, at 563 (noting the historical backdrop against which the Sherman Act 
was enacted). 
 27 See H.R. REP. NO. 51-1707, at 1 (stating the dual objectives of the Sherman Act); Fox, supra 
note 13, at 563 (providing historical context for the passage of the Sherman Act). 
 28 See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2284 (2018) (identifying higher prices and 
decreased quality of products as direct evidence of anticompetitive behavior); Fox, supra note 13, at 
563–64 (noting the initial impetus of the Sherman Act was not for the benefit of consumers, but for 
businesses that were at the mercy of trusts). 
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a. Dissecting the Sherman Act 
The Sherman Act has two main sections that dictate what behavior is an-
ticompetitive, and thus, unlawful.29 Section 1 of the Sherman Act targets, and 
further requires for conviction, a coordinated effort by two or more parties to 
participate in anticompetitive behavior that restricts a market.30 Although the 
plain language of § 1 of the Sherman Act seems to preclude any agreed upon 
anticompetitive activity that restricts trade, the Supreme Court has made it 
clear that § 1 only applies to restrictions of trade that are unreasonable.31 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act makes illegal any monopoly, or attempt to 
achieve a monopoly, in any part of trade or commerce in the United States, 
whether a party acts alone or in concert with others.32 In defining a monopoly, 
courts look not at the position of a single competitor in a market, but rather at 
the actions of an alleged monopoly in obtaining its market share.33 Market 
power obtained as the result of having a product that is preferable to that of 
competitors or by being more efficient than competitors does not necessarily 
create an illegal monopoly under § 2.34 Of particular importance in the litiga-
tion of antitrust conflicts is the fact that antitrust law under the Sherman Act 
does not intend to protect the right of any one firm to compete in a market, but 
rather seeks to protect competition in general.35 
                                                                                                                           
 29 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2. Whereas §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act provide for conduct that is labeled 
illegal, and charge a convicted party of a felony, §§ 3–7 serve to expand jurisdiction of the Sherman 
Act into Washington D.C. and the territories of the United States (§ 3), grant jurisdiction to the federal 
district courts (§ 4), provide procedural instruction for making a claim under the Sherman Act (§ 5), 
limit applicability of the Sherman Act to certain economic activity with foreign countries (§ 6a), and 
provide definitions (§ 7). Id. §§ 1–7. 
 30 Id. § 1. As relevant, § 1 of the Sherman Act states: “Every contract, combination in the form of 
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with 
foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.” Id.; see Am. Needle, 560 U.S. at 190 (noting the exclusive 
applicability of § 1 to coordinated behavior that restrains trade); Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube 
Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984) (quoting Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 149 (1968)) (stating 
that § 1 of the Sherman Act requires multiple actors for liability). 
 31 See Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 790 n.20 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that § 1 only addresses 
unreasonable restraints on trade); Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911) 
(limiting applicability of § 1 to “undue restraints”). 
 32 15 U.S.C. § 2; see Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 767 (noting the applicability of § 2 to single firm 
actors). 
 33 See Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 767–68 (noting that some conduct that appears to restrain trade 
from the perspective of a competitor is allowable as a firm taking advantage of the competitive market 
forces). 
 34 See id. at 767 & n.14 (quoting United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966)) (not-
ing legitimate competition may result in market power for a single firm without triggering antitrust 
violations). 
 35 See id. at 767 n.14 (quoting Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 
(1977)) (stating that the goal of antitrust laws is to protect competition and not any single market par-
ticipant). 
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In 1984, in Copperweld Corp. v. Independent Tube Corp., the Supreme 
Court discussed additional differences in the application of §§ 1 and 2 of the 
Sherman Act.36 The Court stated that alleged violations of § 1 are subject to 
more intense scrutiny than those claimed under § 2 because the participation of 
multiple parties increases the risk of anticompetitive behavior.37 The Copper-
weld decision created two standards for anticompetitive results under the 
Sherman Act, which depend on whether an individual or group engaged in the 
challenged conduct.38 Cooperative actions violate § 1 if there is evidence of an 
“unreasonable restraint of trade,” but unilateral action is only a violation under 
§ 2 if there is a threat of a monopoly, independent of restrictions posed on the 
competitive market.39 
b. Methodology of Analysis in Determining Liability Under § 1 of the 
Sherman Act 
Courts have set out two means of determining whether conduct chal-
lenged under § 1 of the Sherman Act is, in fact, illegal.40 The first instance, per 
se illegality, occurs when conduct required under an agreement has such obvi-
ous negative effects on competition that it is deemed a violation without re-
quiring any further inquiry into actual harm.41 The second, and more common-
ly applied path to liability is a “rule of reason” analysis.42 This requires that a 
court examine all aspects of an agreement in determining whether it violates 
                                                                                                                           
 36 See id. at 768 (comparing §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act). The discussion of §§ 1 and 2 of the 
Sherman Act in Copperweld came in the context of determining whether a parent and wholly-owned 
subsidiary may enter into an agreement in the manner required for antitrust liability under § 1 of the 
Sherman Act. Id. at 759. 
 37 See id. at 767–69 (stating that coordinated behavior under § 1 receives a more intense review 
than behavior of a single actor under § 2). In identifying the increased risks of concerted activity that 
is the purview of § 1, the Court focused on the fact that agreements between competitors inherently 
result in a decrease in diversity of strategy in a market and provides the participants more market 
power with which they can achieve their goals. See id. at 768–69 (discussing Congress’s goals in 
treating concerted activity more strictly than unilateral conduct). 
 38 See id. at 768 (contrasting unilateral and concerted activity); Andrew I. Gavil, Copperweld 
2000: The Vanishing Gap Between Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 87, 87–
88 (2000) (discussing the relationship between §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act).  
 39 Gavil, supra note 38, at 87–88 (citing Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 767). 
 40 See Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 768 (identifying per se illegality and illegality under the rule of 
reason). 
 41 See id. (identifying horizontal price fixing and market allocation as examples of agreements 
that warrant per se liability); see also N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (noting 
that some behavior is so certain to negatively impact competition that the act itself warrants illegality). 
 42 See Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 768 (identifying rule of reason analysis as the alternative to per se 
illegality); Cont’l T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977) (identifying the rule of 
reason test as the predominant method of analysis in cases considering § 1 of the Sherman Act). 
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§ 1 of the Sherman Act.43 These aspects include the market power held by the 
defendant, the structure of the market in which the defendant operates, and the 
actual effect of the agreement.44 Ultimately, a finding of liability under the rule 
of reason test requires that a court find that multiple parties are engaging in 
behavior that has a net negative effect on competition, and the combination of 
the market power of those parties is sufficient as to actually affect the market.45 
Unlike a per se analysis, the rule of reason allows for the continuation of be-
havior that may appear anticompetitive from the perspective of affected com-
petitors, but in fact preserves competition for the benefit of consumers.46 
A rule of reason analysis usually requires that a court identify the relevant 
market, which includes both the “product” and “geographic” markets.47 A 
product market consists of all products that are acceptable as substitutes to 
consumers.48 Even if a precise market is indiscernible, clear evidence showing 
coordinated behavior between parties resulting in anticompetitive outcomes 
can cure the lack of specificity in a market determination.49 Once the relevant 
                                                                                                                           
 43 See Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 49 (citing Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S 231, 238 
(1918)) (describing the rule of reason analysis as totality test to determine whether challenged conduct 
has a net anticompetitive effect). 
 44 See Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 768 (providing considerations of a rule of reason test for conduct 
that is not inherently anticompetitive). 
 45 See Cal. Dental Ass’n v. F.T.C., 526 U.S. 756, 782 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (identifying a four-part analytical tree in assessing whether challenged activity is 
net anticompetitive); Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 49 (identifying the rule of reason test as the proper method 
of analysis in cases considering § 1 of the Sherman Act). The test that Justice Breyer identified in 
California Dental Ass’n requires asking: “(1) What is the specific restraint at issue? (2) What are its 
likely anticompetitive effects? (3) Are there offsetting procompetitive justifications? (4) Do the parties 
have sufficient market power to make a difference?” 526 U.S. at 782 (Breyer, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). The Court in Sylvania noted that the target of a rule of reason analysis is to 
determine whether the totality of the circumstances suggests that the challenged conduct is unreasona-
bly anticompetitive. 433 U.S. at 49. 
 46 See WILLIAM C. HOLMES & MELISSA H. MANGIARACINA, ANTITRUST LAW HANDBOOK 
§ 2:10 n.3 (2019 ed.), Westlaw ANTITRHDBK (quoting Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2284) (stating 
that a rule of reason analysis is intended to separate anticompetitive conduct that is harmful to con-
sumers from that which is perhaps beneficial). 
 47 See id. § 2:10 & n.5 (collecting cases treating identification of the relevant market as a neces-
sary step in a rule of reason analysis). See generally Comment, Leveling the Playing Field: Relevant 
Product Market Definition in Sports Franchise Relocation Cases, 2000 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 245, 251–
52, 258–64 (discussing the application of product markets in antitrust cases and examining product 
market definitions in the context of sports leagues). 
 48 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 482 (1992) (citing United 
States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 404 (1956)) (stating that if a product does not 
have any substitutes it exists in a product market of its own). For example, in Kodak, no alternate 
manufacturers made the parts required to repair Kodak’s products, so the product market for Kodak 
parts was limited to those parts manufactured by Kodak itself. Id. 
 49 See du Pont, 351 U.S. at 391 (identifying examples of conduct that affects competition); 
HOLMES & MANGIARACINA, supra note 46, § 2:10 (quoting F.T.C. v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 
447, 460–61 (1986)) (noting that market definition allows for a judgment on potential anticompetitive 
effects that is not needed if those effects can be directly shown). 
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market is defined, a plaintiff must also show that the defendant has sufficient 
market power to affect competition, through, for example, undue control of 
prices or the exclusion of competition.50 
2. The Clayton Act 
The Clayton Act, which was passed into law in 1914, was the second in-
stallment of antitrust legislation in the United States.51 Having passed the 
Sherman Act in 1890, Congress’s intent in passing the Clayton Act was to fill 
certain gaps that survived the prior legislation, and to further prevent behavior 
that limited competition.52 To achieve this goal, the Clayton Act identifies, and 
makes unlawful, several discrete practices that Congress identified as being 
potentially threatening to free competition.53 
B. Parallel Exclusion as a Violation of the Sherman Act 
As discussed above, one of the major distinctions between §§ 1 and 2 of 
the Sherman Act is the requirement under § 1 that a “contract, combination in 
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy” be present.54 Conversely, § 2 of 
the Sherman Act only pertains to single defendants that have obtained, at-
tempted to obtain, or conspired to obtain a monopoly in a certain area of com-
merce.55 Parallel exclusion may exist where multiple parties participate in sim-
ilar conduct or practices, or have mirrored policies that result in partial or total 
                                                                                                                           
 50 See du Pont, 351 U.S. at 391 (discussing du Pont’s market power in the cellophane market). 
 51 See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27. 
 52 See S. REP. NO. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess., at 2 (1914) (identifying the purpose of the Clayton 
Act). Among the goals of the Clayton Act was to make certain practices that existing antitrust law did 
not cover, yet may have had the effect of furthering the “creation of trusts, conspiracies, and monopo-
lies in their incipiency and before consummation,” illegal. Id.; see Fox, supra note 13, at 564 (detail-
ing the historical context and goals of the Sherman and Clayton Acts). While the Sherman Act target-
ed anticompetitive behavior that already existed, the Clayton Act sought to prevent actions by firms in 
a market that may lead to a decline of competition. See Fox, supra note 13, at 564 (detailing the goals 
of the Clayton Act in expanding antitrust coverage). 
 53 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 13–14 (detailing specific activity that is punishable under the statute). Exam-
ples of conduct that the Clayton Act prohibits are price discrimination and mergers of companies that 
reduce competition or create the risk of monopoly formation. Id. §§ 13, 18; see also Brunswick, 429 
U.S. at 485 (quoting United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 597 (1957)) 
(providing for the application of § 18 of the Clayton Act to mergers that have anticompetitive effects, 
although the respondent did not challenge, and the Court did not decide, whether mergers of a majori-
ty of bowling alleys in a market created an anticompetitive effect). As the Court points out in Bruns-
wick, provisions of the Clayton Act intend to be viable before a Sherman Act claim ripens. 429 U.S. at 
485 (identifying the Clayton Act as a “prophylactic measure” to prevent anticompetitive behavior 
before it occurs).  
 54 15 U.S.C. § 1; see Fox, supra note 13, at 564 (noting the differences between the Sherman and 
Clayton Acts). 
 55 15 U.S.C. § 2. 
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exclusion of new competitors in a marketplace.56 Due to the ability of distinct 
entities in a market to mirror the behavior of others, parallel exclusion may be 
pursued absent any agreement required for antitrust liability under § 1 of the 
Sherman Act.57 Meanwhile, it remains likely that each individual participant 
still lacks the necessary market power to have “monopolized” the industry and 
run afoul of § 2 of the Sherman Act.58 Parallel exclusion thus allows independ-
ent actors to enjoy the benefits of monopolization without direct risk of anti-
trust liability.59 
In their seminal article on parallel exclusion, Professors C. Scott 
Hemphill and Tim Wu identify three criteria in which there is a likely risk that 
parallel exclusion may be enacted to inhibit competition.60 First, parallel ex-
clusion is more common in markets that have few existing actors.61 Second, 
parallel exclusion is more effective when used to prevent the entry of a new 
competitor into a market.62 The third criterion identified by Hemphill and Wu 
is the cost of enacting the strategy of exclusion.63 The authors go on to identify 
                                                                                                                           
 56 See Hemphill & Wu, supra note 9, at 1185 (defining parallel exclusion). 
 57 See id. at 1186–87 (noting the absence of an agreement as a bar on liability under § 1 of the 
Sherman Act). 
 58 See id. (proposing that § 2 of the Sherman Act should expand to cover parallel exclusion). 
 59 See id. at 1192–93 (presenting case studies, including United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 
F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2003), to illustrate how parallel exclusion may exist in practice). Professors 
Hemphill and Wu identify oligopolies—or markets that are composed of a small number of competi-
tors—as the optimal setting for parallel exclusion. Id. at 1192. In Visa, the corporate entities that is-
sued MasterCard and Visa credit cards each adopted bylaws that forbade members from issuing 
American Express or Discover credit cards. 344 F.3d at 236 & n.3. The court found that the exclusion 
of American Express and Discover from the market (consisting primarily of the four mentioned enti-
ties) was, in and of itself, evidence of harm to competition. Id. at 240. In this instance, the court 
deemed the market power and effect of the actions unlawful, even though MasterCard enacted its 
bylaw after Visa and with no coordination between the parties. See Hemphill & Wu, supra note 9, at 
1224 (citing Brief of United States at 19, Visa, 344 F.3d 229 (Nos. 02-6074, 02-6076, 02-6078), 2002 
WL 32819130, at *18) (detailing the timing of enactment of the exclusionary bylaws by Visa and 
MasterCard, and noting MasterCard’s unilateral decision whether to adopt similar policies to join Visa 
in excluding American Express or, alternatively, try and compete with Visa).  
 60 See Hemphill & Wu, supra note 9, at 1192, 1210 (listing three criteria for parallel exclusion). 
 61 Id. at 1192. Currently, of the thirty-two teams in the NFL, only Los Angeles and New York 
City are home to multiple franchises. See Teams, supra note 5 (providing links to the official websites 
of all thirty-two NFL franchises). 
 62 Hemphill & Wu, supra note 9, at 1210. This criterion can be specifically contrasted against 
attempting to force an already-established competitor out of a market, in which case parallel exclusion 
is less likely. Id. 
 63 See id. (noting that actors are likely to be willing to pay to exclude in rough proportion to the 
amount of benefit they anticipate collecting). The case of Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian 
Head, Inc. is illustrative of this contention. See 486 U.S. 492 (1988) (deciding the antitrust liability of 
a voting scheme that resulted in the practical denial of a new competitor into the market for electrical 
conduit); Hemphill & Wu, supra note 9, at 1201, 1210 (using Allied Tube to explain the proposition of 
cost factoring into an entity’s decision to exclude). In Allied Tube, a manufacturer of polyvinyl chlo-
ride (PVC) conduit petitioned to have its product approved for use with electrical wiring systems. 486 
U.S. at 495–96. To prevent the approval, members of the voting association who had interests in the 
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the potential harms of parallel exclusion, such as giving participants the oppor-
tunity to charge above the efficient market price, but also note that activity 
such as uniform standards within an industry may have exclusionary effects 
that are actually beneficial to competition.64 Standard setting, however, if ex-
clusively designed to prevent the entrance of competitors, lacks the beneficial 
effects for consumers that prevent the practices from being anticompetitive per 
se.65 
1. Parallel Exclusion as a Prisoner’s Dilemma Analysis 
Like the classic prisoner’s dilemma, parallel exclusion between two or 
more participants in a market may present conflicting incentives for each deci-
sionmaker.66 When deciding whether to exclude or not, participants in a 
scheme of parallel exclusion face only two choices, similar to the prisoners in 
the model scenario.67 Although the decision not to exclude a competitor may 
not negatively impact certain actors at the time of entry, permanence of the 
market and certain other participants force decisionmakers to consider the po-
                                                                                                                           
use of steel conduit issued and paid for memberships for individuals promising to vote against the 
proposal. Id. at 496–97. Although the defendants in Allied Tube formed an agreement implicating § 1 
of the Sherman Act, because the cost of implementation was not excessive, and the denial of the pro-
posal would prevent (in theory) the introduction of potentially disrupting improvement in the market, 
the circumstances were ripe for parallel exclusion. See id. at 496–97, 510–11 (stating the price paid by 
steel interests and detailing the improvements of PVC over steel); Hemphill & Wu, supra note 9, at 
1210 (using the low cost of acquiring votes in Allied Tube as an example of a scenario where parallel 
exclusion may be implemented). 
 64 See Hemphill & Wu, supra note 9, at 1213, 1215–16 (identifying potential harms of parallel 
exclusion, such as the ability of the excluders to earn “supracompetitive profits” above the level that 
would be expected or achievable in a competitive environment). Hemphill and Wu also note potential 
benefits that may result from parallel exclusion, such as the setting of uniform standards, although 
exclusionary, which allow for interoperability that advances competition and innovation. Id. 
 65 See id. at 1216–17 (using Allied Tube as an example to show that standard-setting can be used 
anticompetitively, for the purpose of excluding competition, or for beneficial purposes such as moti-
vating progress or quality control, and therefore, per se liability is inappropriate). 
 66 See id. at 1221–22 (providing scenarios where certain actors may benefit at the expense of 
others by defecting and allowing a competitor to enter); see also Prisoner’s Dilemma, ENCYCLOPAE-
DIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/prisoners-dilemma [https://perma.cc/UP3M-
LTKJ] (defining “prisoner’s dilemma”). In the traditional narrative of a prisoner’s dilemma, two par-
ties are in a situation where coordinated decisions would allow each party to benefit from the net op-
timal outcome, but there is no communication between the parties. See Prisoner’s Dilemma, supra. In 
the hypothetical scenario of two prisoners, each must decide whether to confess or not to confess to a 
crime. Id. If one confesses and the other does not, the withholding party serves a full prison sentence 
while the other is set free. Id. If both confess, they will each spend a significant amount of time in 
prison. Id. The final, optimal outcome, occurs when both prisoners remain silent, resulting in each 
party receiving a (relatively) insignificant amount of time in prison. Id. If the possible outcomes are 
presented to each prisoner, both have an incentive to confess, hoping that they are set free, although 
the net result is worse than if neither confesses. Id. 
 67 Hemphill & Wu, supra note 9, at 1223; see Prisoner’s Dilemma, supra note 66 (presenting the 
traditional prisoner’s dilemma and the options for each actor to either cooperate or not). 
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tential impact on their future interests, not only the immediate impact of a new 
entrant.68 
Unlike a prisoner’s dilemma, however, Hemphill and Wu note that the 
structure and incentives of parallel exclusion allow “interdependent excluders” 
to act in a mutually beneficial and exclusionary manner without the communi-
cations needed for an agreement under § 1 of the Sherman Act.69 This is par-
ticularly true when government action has provided protection from competi-
tion in the past, allowing players to follow traditional industry practices that 
may result in an exclusionary effect.70 
Apart from being easy to enact, parallel exclusion may diverge from a di-
rect analogy to a prisoner’s dilemma when the members of a market are not in 
direct competition with one another, such as in the case of regional monopo-
lies.71 In this scenario, each individual member has clear incentive to prevent 
the entry of a competitor into its own region, and other members benefit from 
exclusion elsewhere as it acts as a check against future competition in their 
own territory.72 
                                                                                                                           
 68 See Hemphill & Wu, supra note 9, at 1221–22 (suggesting that in certain scenarios actors are 
continuously incentivized to act in concert with their competitors, with no economic motivation to 
defect, in which case the parallel exclusion prisoner’s dilemma becomes a “coordination game”). 
Unlike a classic prisoner’s dilemma, where there is one action taken on the part of each actor and no 
future consequences, Hemphill and Wu cast parallel exclusion as a multi-turn “game” in which actors 
make decisions based in part on how they will shift the status quo, with the result being coordinated 
action. Id. 
 69 Id. at 1226. The identified characteristics facilitating successful exclusion, as compared to other 
anticompetitive conduct, are “simplicity, transparency, and permanence” of the conduct. Id. Hemphill 
and Wu note that, unlike having to coordinate with competitors to set and maintain an oligopolistic 
price, each participant in parallel exclusion only needs to decide whether to deal with new competi-
tors. Id. at 1222–23. The binary nature of the decision to exclude or not exclude also eliminates hard 
to detect self-interested conduct taken on the part of one of the would-be participants in an anticom-
petitive scheme, allowing easier monitoring by co-excluders. Id. at 1223. Whereas in a price fixing 
arrangement any participant may make a secret, independent deal that undercuts the goals of the over-
all scheme, the presence of a new market entrant necessarily alerts participants in parallel exclusion 
that a party has defected. Id. Finally, unlike anticompetitive pricing schemes that can be rolled back, 
parallel exclusion is relatively permanent in controlling the composition of a market. Id. at 1223–24. 
 70 See id. at 1229–30 (using the history of AT&T and the American film industry as examples of 
prior government protection forming the basis for later exclusionary practices). 
 71 See id. at 1232 (suggesting that parallel exclusion may become the dominant strategy for a 
prisoner’s dilemma game where excluders do not compete). 
 72 See id. at 1234 (proposing incentives for regional monopolies to exclude competition elsewhere 
in the marketplace). Hemphill and Wu use Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly as a descriptive model of 
the incentives of regional monopolies to adopt a scheme of parallel exclusion. Id. (citing Bell Atl. 
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)). In Twombly, plaintiffs alleged that the companies, which 
formed as a result of the divesture of AT&T, unlawfully restrained trade by acting in unison to prevent 
competitors from forming in their regions. 550 U.S. at 549–50. Although the Court concluded that the 
plaintiffs failed to state a claim sufficient to avoid summary judgment against them, it acknowledged 
that clear economic incentives existed, motivating each defendant to try and prevent competition in its 
territory, and found that the claim that a competitor’s successful entry into an established market could 
promote similar entries in other markets was persuasive. Id. at 566, 570. 
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C. Exemptions and Immunities from Antitrust Liability for  
Sports Leagues in the United States 
This Section introduces two different legislative exemptions from antitrust 
law as they apply, or have applied, to sports leagues in the United States.73 Sub-
section 1 discusses 15 U.S.C. § 1291, which has direct application to the NFL.74 
Subsection 2 then introduces 15 U.S.C. § 26(b) as an example of legislation that 
Congress has passed and its application to professional sports leagues.75 
1. The Sports Broadcasting Act: Congressional Aid in Broadcasting and 
Merger 
As suggested by its title, 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (Sports Broadcasting Act) pro-
vides antitrust exemptions related to the broadcasting of athletic events and 
mergers of professional football leagues under certain conditions.76 Enacted 
originally in 1961, § 1291 allowed professional football, baseball, basketball, 
and hockey leagues to enter into joint agreements issuing exclusive rights to 
telecasts of their respective games without being subject to antitrust liability.77 
Subsequently amended in 1966, the current version of § 1291 maintains the 
limited broadcast exemption as well as expands the exemption to include mer-
gers of tax-exempt football leagues into a single league, so long as the result-
ing league is also tax-exempt, and the merger results in a league with more 
active teams.78 
                                                                                                                           
 73 See infra notes 76–85 and accompanying text. 
 74 See infra notes 76–78 and accompanying text. 
 75 See infra notes 79–85 and accompanying text. 
 76 See 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (exempting agreements between professional sports teams relating to 
sponsored telecasts). To merge under 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (Sports Broadcasting Act), members of two or 
more professional football leagues must be tax-exempt under § 501(c)(6) of the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1986, form a league that is likewise exempt, and the net result must be to increase the total 
number of professional football teams in existence. Id. 
 77 Pub. L. No. 87-331, § 1, 75 Stat. 732 (1961) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1291). Inter-
estingly, prior to the passage of the 1961 legislation, the NFL added an expansion franchise in Minne-
sota, the home state of the senator that was the Chairman of the Committee in which the legislation 
was considered. See Mid-S. Grizzlies, 720 F.2d at 784 (addressing the circumstances surrounding the 
addition of the Minnesota franchise). 
 78 15 U.S.C. § 1291; see Mid-S. Grizzlies, 720 F.2d at 775 (providing background of the devel-
opment of § 1291); Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., The Antitrust Rationale for the Expansion of Professional 
Sports Leagues, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1677, 1723 (1996) (noting the limited scope of § 1291). Specifical-
ly, § 1291 exempts professional sports leagues from the provisions of § 1 of the Clayton Act (15 
U.S.C. § 12) and the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended (15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58). 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1291. After proposal of the 1966 legislation, the NFL granted an expansion franchise to New Orle-
ans, Louisiana, which was the home state of a senator that supported the passage of the bill. Mid-S. 
Grizzlies, 720 F.2d at 784. 
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2. Major League Baseball as an Example of Greater Congressional 
Protection 
Although included in the coverage of the Sports Broadcasting Act, pro-
fessional baseball is the beneficiary of additional legislation that acts as a 
shield against antitrust liability.79 Codified within the Clayton Act, § 26b 
(Baseball Exemption) limits U.S. antitrust law as applied to professional base-
ball.80 It excludes enforcement in areas that pertain to any conduct that “re-
late[s] to or affect[s] employment of major league baseball players,” specifical-
ly limited to employment at the major league level.81 In its language, the Base-
ball Exemption states that this treatment of professional baseball is unique, 
providing that in areas relating to employing players, baseball is subject to the 
same antitrust laws as all other professional sports leagues.82 Courts have had 
several occasions to interpret the Baseball Exemption, and have held that it 
applies to all aspects of coordinating and distributing professional baseball 
games for profit.83 Of note is § 26b(b)(3) of the Baseball Exemption, which 
specifically exempts application of the U.S. antitrust laws to “franchise expan-
sion, location, or relocation” of professional baseball teams.84 Congress 
amended the Baseball Exemption in 1998 with the passage of the Curt Flood 
Act, which modified certain applications of the Baseball Exemption relating to 
player labor issues, but did not affect its application to franchise location.85 
D. The National Football League as an Entity: Policies  
and History of NFL Expansion 
The NFL is an unincorporated association of thirty-two professional foot-
ball teams headquartered in New York City.86 Founded initially in 1920 in 
                                                                                                                           
 79 15 U.S.C. § 1291; see id. § 26b (highlighting a portion of the Clayton Act applicable solely to 
professional major league baseball). 
 80 Id. § 26b(b). 
 81 Id. 
 82 See id. § 26b(a) (stating that, other than as dictated in subsections (b) through (d), all profes-
sional sports are subject to the same antitrust laws). 
 83 See City of San Jose v. Office of the Comm’r of Baseball, 776 F.3d 686, 688–89, 690 (9th Cir. 
2015) (quoting Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953)) (describing three cases that 
track the development of 15 U.S.C. § 26b (Baseball Exemption) and stating they “clearly extend the 
baseball exemption to the entire ‘business of providing public baseball games for profit between clubs 
of professional baseball players’”). 
 84 15 U.S.C. § 26b(b)(3). As defined by § 1 of the Clayton Act, “antitrust laws” include §§ 1 and 
2 of the Sherman Act. 15 U.S.C. § 12(a). 
 85 City of San Jose, 776 F.3d at 690. The Curt Flood Act served to modify the existing language 
of the Clayton Act, but it is not a standalone statute. Pub. L. No. 105–297, 112 Stat. 2824 (1998) (cod-
ified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 26b). 
 86 Am. Needle, 560 U.S. at 187; Claudia G. Catalano, Annotation, Application of Federal Anti-
trust Laws to Professional Sports, 79 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 1 (2013); see Teams, supra note 5 (listing the 
thirty-two NFL franchises). The NFL existed as a tax-exempt non-profit entity under § 501(c)(6) of 
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Canton, Ohio, the league adopted its current name in 1922.87 Although the ini-
tial years following its formation were not immediately profitable for all mem-
ber teams, the NFL has grown to be a national success and has stability and 
viability in the market of professional football unseen by any of its competi-
tors.88 
Included in the business model of the NFL is a system of revenue sharing, 
where all franchises pool earnings and then evenly distribute them among the 
teams.89 Shared revenue consists of money earned from national media deals, 
merchandise sales and licensing, and ticket sales.90 Meanwhile, each franchise 
                                                                                                                           
the Internal Revenue Code from 1942 until 2015, when it elected to forgo its tax-exempt status. See 
Mid-S. Grizzlies, 720 F.2d at 775 (noting the tax-exempt status of the NFL); Jared Dubin, NFL Ends 
Tax Exempt Status After 73 Years: 3 Things to Know, CBS SPORTS (Apr. 28, 2015), https://www.cbs
sports.com/nfl/news/nfl-ends-tax-exempt-status-after-73-years-3-things-to-know [https://perma.cc/
H63B-FQSD] (showing a memo sent from the Commissioner of the NFL to the owners of the 
league’s member franchises). 
 87 U.S. Football League v. Nat’l Football League, 842 F.2d 1335, 1343 (2d Cir. 1988). 
 88 See id. at 1343–44 (stating that forty-one teams failed in the early years of the NFL and detail-
ing attempts by the World Football League (WFL) and United States Football League (USFL) to form 
competing football leagues); see also Thomas Barrabi, XFL, USFL, Other Pro Football Leagues That 
Took on the NFL, FOX BUS. (Dec. 6, 2018), https://www.foxbusiness.com/features/xfl-usfl-other-pro-
football-leagues-that-took-on-the-nfl [https://perma.cc/L5VN-D6TV] (noting the tendency for the 
United States to have only one professional football league and summarizing failed attempts by the 
USFL, the XFL, and the United Football League (UFL) to enter the market); Ira Boudway & Eben 
Novy-Williams, The NFL’s Very Profitable Existential Crisis, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 
13, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2018-09-13/nfl-makes-more-money-than-ever-
and-things-have-never-been-worse [https://perma.cc/4RR8-SR34] (stating that across the NFL reve-
nue has increased 47% since 2012, and that the Green Bay Packers, the only NFL franchise that is 
publicly owned and thus required to publish financial statements, has seen increased revenue over 
each of the past fifteen years); Earl Gustkey, A Big Splash, Then No Cash: WFL Made History in 
1974, but ‘Whiffle Ball’ Didn’t Last, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 31, 1994), http://articles.latimes.com/1994-03-
31/sports/sp-40651_1_whiffle-ball [https://perma.cc/BUR6-VKWQ] (tracking the life of the WFL 
from its first game on July 10, 1974, through its collapse on October 22, 1975); Report: NFL Teams’ 
Revenue Share Topped $8 Billion in 2017, REUTERS (July 17, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-football-nfl-gb-nfl-revenues/report-nfl-teams-revenue-share-topped-8-billion-in-2017-idUSKBN
1K719F [https://perma.cc/TLJ5-X8GQ] (calculating that the thirty-two NFL franchises’ revenue in-
creased 4.9% to more than $8 billion in 2017). 
 89 Howard Bloom, NFL Revenue-Sharing Model Good for Business, SPORTING NEWS (Sept. 5, 
2014), http://www.sportingnews.com/us/nfl/news/nfl-revenue-sharing-television-contracts-2014-season-
business-model-nba-nhl-mlb-comparison-salary-cap/gu0xok7mphu01x3vu875oeaq6 [https://perma.
cc/GE59-HGG5] (stating the NFL splits over 60% of the total revenue earned by the league). 
 90 Gabriel Feldman, The Puzzling Persistence of the Single-Entity Argument for Sports Leagues: 
American Needle and the Supreme Court’s Opportunity to Reject A Flawed Defense, 2009 WIS. L. 
REV. 835, 889; Bloom, supra note 89. Although revenue generated from ticket sales to games are 
included in the sharing system, distribution is not equal. See Piraino, supra note 78, at 1700 n.107 
(citing Michael S. Jacobs, Professional Sports Leagues, Antitrust, and the Single-Entity Theory: A 
Defense of the Status Quo, 67 IND. L.J. 25, 31 n.27 (1991)) (detailing the distribution of gate revenues 
for NFL teams). Sixty percent of the money goes to the hosting franchise, while 40% goes to the visi-
tor. Id. Additionally, the Dallas Cowboys do not participate in revenue sharing as it pertains to the sale 
of merchandise. Bloom, supra note 89.  
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independently retains all the money that is made from local sources, such as 
local media and advertising, sale of concessions, parking, and luxury seating.91 
In 1966, when the NFL consisted of fifteen teams, the league agreed to 
merge with the American Football League (AFL).92 The New Orleans Saints 
franchise was added as an expansion team to the NFL in 1967, and when the 
merger between the NFL and AFL was finalized in 1970, the newly formed 
NFL consisted of twenty-six teams.93 Since the merger, six additional expan-
sion franchises have been added.94 The Seattle Seahawks and Tampa Bay Buc-
caneers received franchises in 1974, along with the Carolina Panthers and 
Jacksonville Jaguars in 1993, the Baltimore Ravens in 1996, and, finally, the 
city of Houston, Texas in 1999 (which then formed the Houston Texans).95 Un-
like the tumultuous beginnings of the NFL, no teams have folded or ceased 
continuous operation since the merger of the NFL and AFL.96 There has also 
been relative stability in ownership of the franchises, as twenty of the teams 
have not been sold in the past twenty years, and ten of those have not traded 
hands since before the finalization of the NFL/AFL merger in 1970.97 
Article III of the NFL Constitution governs the process of adding an ex-
pansion team to the NFL.98 According to Article 3.1(B), for a new team to be 
admitted into the NFL, at least three-fourths of the then-existing teams must 
                                                                                                                           
 91 Feldman, supra note 90, at 889; Piraino, supra note 78, at 1700 n.107 (citing Adam Teicher, 
NFL Teams Walk When Money Talks, KAN. CITY STAR, Nov. 12, 1995, at A1); Bloom, supra note 89.  
 92 See U.S. Football League, 842 F.2d at 1344 (listing the NFL teams in existence at the time of 
the merger between the NFL and American Football League (AFL)). 
 93 See id. (providing the effective date of the merger and full list of teams then members of the 
league). 
 94 Chronology of Professional Football, in 2013 NFL RECORD & FACT BOOK 361, 366–68, 
http://static.nfl.com/static/content/public/image/history/pdfs/History/2013/353-372-Chronology.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WBX8-C99F] (recording the entry of the Seattle, Tampa Bay, Carolina, Jackson-
ville, Baltimore Ravens, and Houston franchises into the NFL).  
 95 Id. at 368. The Houston, Texas franchise was initially granted to the city of Houston and owner 
Robert McNair. Id. The franchise did not officially become the Houston Texans until after the fran-
chise was granted. Id. 
 96 See U.S. Football League, 842 F.2d at 1343 (identifying multiple bankruptcies in the early 
years of the NFL); Chronology of Professional Football, supra note 94, at 360–72. 
 97 See Kevin Baumer, What Every NFL Owner Paid for Their Team—and What It’s Worth Today, 
BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 16, 2010), https://www.businessinsider.com/how-much-did-nfl-owners-paid-for-
their-teams-2010-10 [https://perma.cc/Q66V-9MYM] (providing the year each NFL franchise was 
obtained by its current owner, updated to include the most recent sale of the Carolina Panthers in 
2018). The Carolina Panthers were sold in 2018 following a revelation of allegations that then-owner 
Jerry Richardson had behaved inappropriately toward employees of the Panthers. Id.; see Ken Ba-
denhausen, Here Are 12 Potential Contenders to Buy the Carolina Panthers, FORBES (Dec. 18, 2017), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/kurtbadenhausen/2017/12/18/here-are-12-potential-new-owners-of-the-
carolina-panthers/#39905056be16 [https://perma.cc/X49V-DUN3] (detailing the legal troubles of 
Richardson). Richardson had purchased the Panthers franchise in 1993 for a total cost of $206 million. 
Badenhausen, supra. 
 98 NFL CONST., supra note 6, at art. III. 
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vote them into the league.99 Once a franchise is established, it receives a 
“Home Territory,” defined under Article IV of the NFL Constitution as the city 
in which the franchise is based, extended out seventy-five miles from the cor-
porate limits of such city.100 Article IV of the NFL Constitution further pro-
vides that NFL franchises are allowed to market their team only in their “Home 
Marketing Area,” defined to include the Home Territory and the state in which 
the base city is located.101 In the case that a state contains more than one fran-
chise, the Home Marketing Area of each team does not include the Home Ter-
ritories of any other team.102 Once a franchise has been granted and a Home 
Territory established, the NFL Constitution provides that no franchise has the 
right to change the city in which it is based without a prior vote of approval by 
at least three-fourths of the teams existing in the league at the time.103 
E. The State of Antitrust Law as Applied to the NFL 
Due to the organizational structure of the NFL, there has been significant 
discussion surrounding, and many cases trying to determine, how antitrust 
laws should be applied.104 Subsection 1 describes the NFL’s attempt to be clas-
sified as a single entity for the purposes of antitrust analysis.105 Subsection 2 
discusses the rule of reason as it has come to be applied as the prevalent test 
for antitrust challenges regarding the NFL.106 Subsection 3 looks at the rele-
vant product and geographical markets for the business of fielding professional 
football games.107 Finally, Subsection 4 summarizes two cases litigated against 
the NFL relating to its franchise relocation and expansion policies.108 
                                                                                                                           
 99 Id. at art. III § 3.1(B). 
 100 Id. at art. IV § 4.1. 
 101 Id. at art. IV § 4.4(A). 
 102 Id. In the case that multiple teams share the same Home Territory, each franchise retains equal 
rights to market within the Home Territory and Home Marketing Area. Id. 
 103 Id. at art. IV § 4.3. 
 104 See Am. Needle, 560 U.S. at 204 (concluding that, although agreements between NFL teams 
are not categorically subject to liability under § 1 of the Sherman Act, they will not always be treated 
as a single entity for the purposes of antitrust litigation); L.A. Mem’l Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1388–90 
(affirming a decision by the district court that the NFL does not act as a single entity); Nathaniel 
Grow, American Needle and the Future of the Single Entity Defense Under Section One of the Sher-
man Act, 48 AM. BUS. L.J. 449, 465–66 & nn.111–13 (2011) (discussing attempts by professional 
sports leagues, organized similar to joint ventures, to be classified as single entities under Copper-
weld). See generally Feldman, supra note 90 (discussing the application of antitrust laws to American 
sports leagues). 
 105 See infra notes 109–114 and accompanying text. 
 106 See infra notes 115–121 and accompanying text. 
 107 See infra notes 122–124 and accompanying text. 
 108 See infra notes 125–142 and accompanying text. 
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1. American Needle and the NFL’s Status as a Single Entity 
Under the Sherman Act, courts analyze conduct that results from a multi-
party agreement under § 1 more strictly than unilateral actions.109 In Copper-
weld, the Supreme Court stated that the presence of multiple parties making 
unilateral decisions aids competition in a market and highlighted the inherent 
anticompetitive risk of coordinated behavior.110 In determining whether multi-
ple defendants should be treated as a single entity, the Copperweld Court held 
that the determining factors include whether the parties share common objec-
tives and whether there is a single “corporate consciousness.”111 
The Supreme Court addressed the NFL’s status as a single entity in 2010 
with its decision in American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League.112 Ap-
plying the Copperweld factors, the Court held that, relevant to the licensing of 
intellectual property that was the subject of the case, the individual NFL teams 
were competitors, and the use of a single NFL-sponsored licensing group con-
solidated all NFL licensing decisions under one party.113 Despite its decision 
that the NFL and its teams do not function as a single entity, and are thus cov-
ered by § 1 of the Sherman Act, the Court made clear that the conclusion did 
not decide liability for the NFL.114 
2. Application of the Rule of Reason to NFL Agreements 
Although its organizational structure does not establish the NFL as a sin-
gle entity following the American Needle decision, existence as a professional 
sports league protects the NFL from having its actions judged as per se viola-
tions of antitrust laws.115 In 1984, in National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. 
                                                                                                                           
 109 Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 768. 
 110 Id. at 768–69. 
 111 See id. at 771 (identifying the unity of interest seen in a parent corporation and a wholly-
owned subsidiary as the characteristic that allows single entity treatment). 
 112 See Am. Needle, 560 U.S. at 186 (deciding a challenge to the NFL’s single entity status). In 
American Needle, a former licensee of the NFL’s licensing entity sued the NFL, challenging the 
agreements between the NFL, its franchises, and the licensing entity as violations of §§ 1 and 2 of the 
Sherman Act. Id. at 187. The NFL defended its actions by asserting that they were unable to violate 
§ 1, as the teams and league functioned as a single entity. Id. at 187–88. 
 113 See id. at 197 (quoting Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 769) (concluding that the aggregation of the 
NFL’s licensing decisions “depriv[ed] the marketplace of independent centers of decisionmaking”). 
The Court additionally highlighted that each NFL franchise is independently-owned and managed, 
thus having “separate corporate consciousnesses.” Id. at 196 (citing Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 771). Of 
importance was the fact that the teams compete with each other in the general football market, includ-
ing for ticket sales. Id. at 196–97. 
 114 See id. at 199 n.7, 204 (concluding that although the NFL does not qualify for the single entity 
defense, coordinated action does not necessarily mean there is § 1 liability). 
 115 See id. at 203 (quoting NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 101, 104 (1984)) (stating that 
when anticompetitive conduct is necessary to make a product available, per se liability of the Sherman 
Act is inappropriate). 
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Board of Regents, the Supreme Court acknowledged that in certain industries it 
might be necessary for participants to restrict competition in order to create a 
product.116 Considering the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) 
to be such an industry, the Court held that applying a per se test for antitrust 
liability would be ill-suited, even for conduct that usually falls under its pur-
view.117 Instead, the Court examined the case under a rule of reason analy-
sis.118 
In American Needle, the Supreme Court extended the application of 
NCAA to the NFL.119 In doing so, the Court implied that, like the NCAA, the 
market for producing professional football games depends on the ability of 
NFL teams to coordinate in a manner that may reduce competition as a re-
sult.120 Taking another step past the NCAA decision, the American Needle 
Court noted that agreements preserving the ability to market a product do not 
only mandate a rule of reason analysis, but are likely to pass the test if the 
marketing of a product depends on the agreement.121 
3. The Relevant Product and Geographical Markets for the NFL 
Important to the completion of a rule of reason analysis is the defining of 
the relevant product and geographical markets in which an industry participant 
operates.122 Following some controversy regarding what product market is rel-
evant for the NFL, the consensus appears to be either the provision of profes-
sional football or, more narrowly, the provision of NFL football.123 As pertain-
                                                                                                                           
 116 NCAA, 468 U.S. at 101. The NCAA Court noted that the National Collegiate Athletic Associa-
tion (NCAA) was necessary to establish uniform rules, promote competition between member institu-
tions, and preserve the character of the sports it oversees. Id. at 101–02. Central to the description of 
what made the NCAA fit in this unique carve-out in antitrust was the inability of any individual insti-
tution to restrict its participants and still compete in the industry. Id. at 102. 
 117 See id. at 100 (finding that an application of per se liability would be inappropriate). 
 118 See id. at 103 (choosing to apply a rule of reason analysis instead of per se antitrust illegality 
to a case alleging horizontal price fixing, although horizontal price fixing usually falls under the lat-
ter). 
 119 See Am. Needle, 560 U.S. at 203 (applying NCAA to the NFL). 
 120 See id. (citing NCAA, 468 U.S. at 117) (suggesting that it would be inappropriate to apply a 
per se rule to the NFL due to the nature of the market). 
 121 See id. (citing Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 23, 99 (1979)) (stating that under 
the industry structure identified by NCAA, “the agreement is likely to survive the Rule of Reason”). 
 122 See HOLMES & MANGIARACINA, supra note 46, § 2:10 & n.5 (collecting cases that treat the 
identification of the relevant market as a threshold issue in a rule of reason analysis). 
 123 See U.S. Football League, 842 F.2d at 1342, 1343 (providing that the plaintiff and defendant 
agreed that the relevant product market at issue was major league professional football); L.A. Mem’l 
Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1393 (defining the tests for relevant product market to include interchangeabil-
ity and cross-elasticity of demand for a product, and seemingly accepting that the unique nature of 
NFL football suggests that it is itself the relevant product market for franchise relocation analyses); 
Mid-S. Grizzlies, 720 F.2d at 783 (citing Mid-S. Grizzlies v. Nat’l Football League, 550 F. Supp. 558, 
571 n.33 (E.D. Pa. 1982)) (providing that the plaintiffs alleged, and the NFL did not challenge, that 
the relevant product market at issue was major league professional football); Lazaroff, supra note 14, 
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ing to the relevant geographic market, the case law suggests that it includes the 
entirety of the United States, with potential sub-markets in the specific regions 
in which franchises exist.124 
4. Challenges to the NFL’s Expansion and Relocation Policies 
a. Expansion in Mid-South Grizzlies v. National Football League 
In 1983, in Mid-South Grizzlies v. National Football League, the Mid-
South Grizzlies (Grizzlies), a former member of the World Football League, 
sued the NFL alleging antitrust violations relating to the NFL’s denial of grant-
ing the Grizzlies an NFL expansion franchise.125 In support of the claim, the 
Grizzlies cited the existence of an established, functioning football business, 
the value of Memphis as a professional football sub-market, and the lack of 
any basis for the denial as evidence of an agreement between the NFL mem-
bers to unreasonably restrict trade in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act.126 
In affirming summary judgment against the Grizzlies, the Third Circuit 
Court of Appeals determined that the NFL had considered sufficient reasons 
for denying the entry of the new franchise and found that the act of leaving the 
Memphis market without a franchise was in fact pro-competitive within the 
market for professional football.127 Further, the court determined that the Griz-
zlies had failed to present a plausible case that the denial of the expansion 
franchise had served to eliminate potential competition between a Memphis 
franchise and one already established in the NFL.128 The court identified ticket 
sales, local broadcast rights, and concession stand and merchandise revenue as 
potential intra-league competition, but determined that it was unlikely that a 
Memphis franchise stimulated such competition.129 In reaching this conclu-
                                                                                                                           
at 207–10 (discussing relevant market definition and suggesting that, due to the lack of close substi-
tutes, NFL football is the logical relevant product market). 
 124 Mid-S. Grizzlies, 720 F.2d at 783 (citing Mid-S. Grizzlies, 550 F. Supp. at 571 n.33) (alleging 
that the relevant geographic market at issue was the United States with a sub-market in the “Mid-
South,” which the NFL did not challenge); see Am. Football League v. Nat’l Football League, 323 
F.2d 124, 130 (4th Cir. 1963) (classifying the conduct of the AFL and NFL as national, and stating 
that the relevant geographic market must include the contiguous United States, and likely, Hawaii, and 
parts of Canada). 
 125 Mid-S. Grizzlies, 720 F.2d at 776–77. 
 126 See id. (noting various reasons in support of plaintiff’s position). 
 127 See id. at 786 (listing the NFL’s stated reasons for denying the franchise). Supporting its claim 
that the act supported competition, the court opined that if a league were to form to compete with the 
NFL, the Grizzlies or another Memphis-based team could then compete with the NFL in a manner that 
the presence of an NFL team in the market would foreclose. Id. 
 128 Id. at 787. 
 129 Id. At the time of the decision, the closest NFL franchise to Memphis was over 280 miles 
away in St. Louis. Id. The court determined that, due to the distance, the plaintiff failed to show that a 
team located in Memphis would compete in ticket sales, local broadcasts, sale of merchandise, or 
another manner with a St. Louis franchise. Id. 
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sion, the court stated that, had the franchise been denied to a team seeking to 
operate within the established territory of another NFL franchise, the antitrust 
analysis could be different.130 
The final component of the Grizzlies’ argument that the court found un-
convincing was its reliance on the essential facilities doctrine.131 The essential 
facilities doctrine suggests that when competition in a market practically de-
pends on becoming a member of an established association, members must be 
admitted on reasonable terms unless the exclusion preserves competition.132 
Although the lower court acknowledged that the NFL clearly held a monopoly 
in professional football in the United States, the Third Circuit found the Griz-
zlies’ argument unpersuasive due to their inability to show that their admission 
to the NFL would result in increased intra-league competition.133 
b. Relocation in Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. National 
Football League 
The next year, in 1984, in Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. 
National Football League, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a ruling 
that the NFL’s franchise relocation policy—requiring approval of three-fourths 
of the league’s members in order to move a team into the Home Territory of 
another member—violated § 1 of the Sherman Act.134 In applying a rule of 
reason analysis, the court determined that the NFL Constitution sufficed to 
form an agreement between the NFL franchises and that the policy was an at-
                                                                                                                           
 130 See id. (suggesting that a franchise application for an expansion team in New York City would 
provide the requisite intra-league competition to support an antitrust challenge under § 1 of the Sher-
man Act). 
 131 See id. (denying the plaintiff’s claim relying on the essential facilities doctrine). 
 132 See id. (citing Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945)) (explaining the essential 
facilities doctrine in relation to the NFL); Piraino, supra note 78, at 1679 (presenting the essential 
facilities doctrine and proposing its application to professional sports leagues). In Associated Press, 
the Supreme Court affirmed that the bylaws of the Associated Press (AP) contained policies that were 
illegal restrictions on AP membership, and “designed to stifle competition in the newspaper publish-
ing field.” 326 U.S. at 4, 11, 23. The policies at issue allowed any member of the AP to challenge the 
admission of a new applicant that would compete in their market, and the veto could only be overruled 
by the vote of four-fifths of all AP members. Id. at 10. 
 133 Mid-S. Grizzlies, 720 F.2d at 783, 787. 
 134 L.A. Mem’l Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1385, 1386, 1401. Following the ruling of the Ninth Circuit, 
the NFL has not changed its relocation policy contained in the NFL Constitution. NFL CONST., supra 
note 6, at art. IV § 4.3. Since the decision, however, teams have not always sought league approval 
before negotiating or announcing relocations. See Piraino, supra note 78, at 1687 & nn.43–44 (citing 
Leonard Shapiro, League’s Forward Progress Is Producing Some Major Pileups, WASH. POST, Nov. 
10, 1995, at C1; Leonard Shapiro, Rams Approved for St. Louis Move, WASH. POST, Apr. 13, 1995, at 
D1; and Timothy W. Smith, N.F.L. Shifts: Seahawks Eye Los Angeles, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1996, at 
B9) (noting the relocation efforts made by the Los Angeles Rams, Cleveland Browns, Houston Oilers, 
and Seattle Seahawks prior to receiving league approval, and the effect of threatened antitrust litiga-
tion based on Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum on an ultimate league vote).  
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tempt to limit or preclude competition.135 The majority of the court’s opinion 
analyzed whether the implementation of the relocation policy had an actual 
impact on competition.136 Initially, the court stated that, although the nature of 
the NFL structure provided members with legitimacy in advancing certain in-
terests of the league, ensuring above market profits for owners was not one of 
them.137 
As an additional argument, the NFL attempted to defend the reasonable-
ness of the relocation policy under the doctrine of ancillary restraints.138 Ancil-
lary restraint is a common-law doctrine that preserves the enforceability of 
certain agreements that have the effect of reducing competition, so long as the 
impetus of the agreement is another legitimate purpose.139 In deciding against 
the NFL, the court found clear anticompetitive effects of the relocation policy, 
stating that enforcement in this case would result in the prevention of natural 
competition between the Rams, the franchise that claimed the Los Angeles ter-
ritory, and the Raiders, the team that sought to relocate there.140 Absent the 
presence of the Raiders in Los Angeles, the court noted that the Rams would 
essentially hold a monopoly, and thus be able to charge above-market prices to 
the disadvantage of local consumers.141 Further, the court determined that the 
ancillary restraints doctrine could not apply, as the NFL’s interest in enforcing 
the relocation policy could have been achieved in a less restrictive manner.142 
                                                                                                                           
 135 See L.A. Mem’l Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1387, 1391, 1395 (identifying the NFL Constitution as 
a sufficient agreement, establishing the framework for the rule of reason analysis, and stating that the 
NFL admitted that the purpose of Rule 4.3 was to restrain competition between NFL teams). The 
exact rule of reason test applied by the Ninth Circuit required the plaintiff to prove: “(1) [a]n agree-
ment among two or more persons or distinct business entities; (2) [w]hich is intended to harm or un-
reasonably restrain competition; (3) [a]nd which actually causes injury to competition [in a relevant 
market].” Id. (quoting Kaplan v. Burroughs Corp., 611 F.2d 286, 290 (9th Cir. 1979)). Following the 
initial determinations, the court weighed anticompetitive effects against those that tended to be pro-
competition. Id. 
 136 See id. at 1391–98 (discussing the application of a rule of reason analysis in the context of the 
NFL relocation policy and its pro- and anticompetitive effects). 
 137 Id. at 1391–92. The court identified “[c]ollective action in areas such as League divisions, 
scheduling and rules . . . [and] other activity that aids in producing the most marketable product at-
tainable” as legitimate interests of NFL franchises. Id. at 1392. 
 138 See id. at 1395 (introducing the NFL’s ancillary restraints argument). 
 139 Id. (quoting Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and 
Market Division, 74 YALE L.J. 775, 797–98 (1965)); see Piraino, supra note 78, at 1680 (presenting 
the ancillary restraints doctrine and proposing its application to professional sports leagues).  
 140 L.A. Mem’l Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1395. The interests that the NFL claimed were that the 
policy protected each team’s investment in joining the league, provided teams with financial stability, 
and supported competitive balance, fan support, marketing decisions, and investments by local gov-
ernments. Id. at 1396. 
 141 Id. at 1395. 
 142 Id. at 1396. Prior to the suit, Al Davis, the owner of the Raiders and party to the litigation, had 
suggested that the NFL use objective guidelines in determining whether or not to approve the reloca-
tion of a franchise, a system the court seemed to consider less prone to antitrust challenge than the 
stated relocation policy. Id. at 1397. 
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II. EXAMINING THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE’S EXPANSION  
POLICIES AS AN ANTITRUST VIOLATION 
Unchecked anticompetitive conduct in any market allows beneficiaries to 
have undue control over prices of their products to the detriment of consum-
ers.143 In the case of NFL football, each team sets its own prices for game tick-
ets, sells team branded merchandise, and has control over its efforts regarding 
the overall fan experience.144 In a system in which potential franchises are un-
naturally excluded from the NFL, each established team is shielded from the 
effects of competition and lacks market pressure to provide a better product.145 
As U.S. antitrust laws currently exist, a challenge to the NFL’s expansion 
policy could come from any of three possible avenues.146 Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act presents the strongest argument for a finding of liability, requir-
ing a challenger to show that an agreement between the NFL franchises was in 
place, properly define the relevant markets, and allege facts sufficient to over-
come a rule of reason analysis.147 Liability under § 2 of the Sherman Act 
would require a showing that the NFL’s expansion policy acts to, or attempts 
to, monopolize the relevant product market in a manner that allows the league 
to inflate prices or exclude competition.148 Finally, a challenger could present 
the expansion policy as parallel exclusion by NFL franchises.149 
                                                                                                                           
 143 See L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 726 F.2d 1381, 1392 (9th Cir. 
1984) (noting the role of anticompetitive agreements in restricting the influence of market forces and 
allowing “unreasonable and arbitrary” prices to be charged). 
 144 See Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 196–97 (2010) (noting competi-
tion between NFL teams for gate revenue and merchandise). 
 145 See Piraino, supra note 78, at 1678 (arguing that limitations on franchise expansion that result 
in below free market levels of NFL franchises result in increased prices and decreased quality). 
 146 See Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (2018) (requiring an agreement between multi-
ple parties, or monopoly power, to impose antitrust liability). See generally Hemphill & Wu, supra 
note 9 (discussing parallel exclusion as a violation of antitrust laws). 
 147 See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (requiring concerted action for liability). Because the single entity determi-
nation and relevant markets are seemingly decided, liability under § 1 of the Sherman Act for the 
NFL’s expansion policy depends only on the balancing of anticompetitive effects and procompetitive 
justifications and, therefore, requires a more developed argument. See Am. Needle, 560 U.S. at 200, 
203–04 (concluding that a rule of reason test is the appropriate review for antitrust challenges to pro-
fessional sports leagues and that the NFL does not qualify for a single entity defense); L.A. Mem’l 
Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1393 (accepting NFL football as the relevant product market for franchise relo-
cation analyses); Mid-S. Grizzlies v. Nat’l Football League, 720 F.2d 772, 783 (3d Cir. 1983) (citing 
Mid-S. Grizzlies v. Nat’l Football League, 550 F. Supp. 558, 571 n.33 (E.D. Pa. 1982)) (establishing 
that the parties accepted that the relevant product market at issue was major league professional foot-
ball); HOLMES & MANGIARACINA, supra note 46, § 2:10 & n.5 (noting that identification of the rele-
vant market as a necessary first step in a rule of reason analysis); Lazaroff, supra note 14, at 207–10 
(suggesting that NFL football is the logical relevant product market). 
 148 See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (making monopolization of any industry, or the attempt to do so, illegal); 
United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956) (stating that a party has 
monopoly power over an industry when they are able to manipulate prices or exclude competitors 
from the market). In addition to the requirements under § 2 of the Sherman Act and market definition 
requirements suggested by du Pont, it is possible that a § 2 challenge to the NFL’s expansion policy 
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A. Section 1 Challenges to the NFL’s Expansion Policy 
Based on the examples of litigation surrounding NFL expansion and relo-
cation policies, it appears that the success of a § 1 challenge depends heavily 
on the facts of the alleged anticompetitive act.150 The threshold question of 
whether the various NFL franchises are party to an agreement, thus implicating 
§ 1, has been answered in the affirmative.151 In Los Angeles Memorial Colise-
um v. National Football League, the Ninth Circuit ruled against the NFL in its 
assertion that NFL franchises could not form an agreement among them-
selves.152 Rejecting the NFL’s single entity defense, consistent with the Su-
preme Court’s later decision in American Needle, Inc. v. National Football 
League, the Ninth Circuit held that each NFL franchise was a separate enti-
ty.153 Further, the court stated that by being parties to the NFL Constitution, the 
franchises formed an actionable agreement under § 1 of the Sherman Act.154 
Although the relevant geographic market appears to be settled as the en-
tirety of the United States, with sub-markets in home locations of existing 
franchises, the determination of the scope of the relevant product market is still 
uncertain.155 In the context of franchise expansions, the relevant product mar-
                                                                                                                           
would require argument around the continued applicability of 15 U.S.C. § 1291. 15 U.S.C. § 2; see id. 
§ 1291 (implicating the tax-exempt status of the NFL); du Pont, 351 U.S. at 391 (assuming monopoly 
power within the defined relevant market); Mid-S. Grizzlies, 720 F.2d at 784, 788 (suggesting that, in 
passing § 1291, Congress must have known that it gave the newly formed NFL a significant ad-
vantage in gaining market power, and thus assented to the result).  
 149 See Hemphill & Wu, supra note 9, at 1185 (defining parallel exclusion). 
 150 See L.A. Mem’l Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1401 (holding that the NFL’s relocation rule, which 
also requires a three-fourths vote, unreasonably restricted relocation under § 1 of the Sherman Act); 
Mid-S. Grizzlies, 720 F.2d at 788 (holding that the record presented by the plaintiff did not create a 
scenario in which § 1 of the Sherman Act was implicated by the NFL’s expansion policy). 
 151 See Mid-S. Grizzlies, 720 F.2d at 783 (stating that the NFL did not challenge the plaintiff’s 
assertion that the requisite vote of NFL franchises regarding potential expansion teams sufficiently 
established an agreement as required under § 1 of the Sherman Act). 
 152 726 F.2d at 1387. 
 153 See Am. Needle, 560 U.S. at 196 (stating that NFL teams do not have the characteristics of a 
single entity); L.A. Mem’l Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1387 (determining that the NFL, including its mem-
ber teams, does not constitute a single entity). 
 154 L.A. Mem’l Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1387. 
 155 See Mid-S. Grizzlies, 720 F.2d at 783 (citing Mid-S. Grizzlies, 550 F. Supp. at 571 n.33) 
(providing that the plaintiffs alleged, and the NFL did not challenge, that the relevant geographic 
market at issue was the United States with a sub-market in the “Mid-South”); Am. Football League v. 
Nat’l Football League, 323 F.2d 124, 130 (4th Cir. 1963) (identifying the relevant geographic market 
as including the contiguous United States and, likely, Hawaii, and parts of Canada); Lazaroff, supra 
note 14, at 207–08 (noting that the determination of both the relevant geographic and product markets 
are necessary for a rule of reason analysis). In Mid-South Grizzlies, the Third Circuit relied, in part, on 
the argument that the NFL’s denial of a franchise to the plaintiffs effectively preserved a location for 
future competition against the NFL. 720 F.2d at 787. If the court had been confined to considering the 
product market as NFL football, this procompetitive argument could likely not have been raised. See 
id. (considering the effect of the NFL’s expansion policy on potential competitors in the market for 
professional football). 
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ket appears to be the provision of NFL football, as opposed to professional 
football as a broader class.156 Although the distinction is not necessarily deter-
minative in either direction, narrowing the product market to include only NFL 
football appears to be representative of the reality that consumers of NFL foot-
ball have no viable substitutes.157 History has shown that competing profes-
sional football leagues have not been successful since the merger of the NFL 
and AFL, and there is no reason to believe that NFL fans view other sports or 
entertainment options as true alternatives to NFL football.158 
Analyzing the NFL’s expansion policy under the rule of reason, there is a 
strong argument that, at least in certain circumstances, the NFL unreasonably 
restricts competition.159 Case law strongly suggests that the NFL’s expansion 
policy of requiring a three-fourths affirmative vote is restrictive, and that the 
NFL exerts significant market power in its product market.160 For the purposes 
                                                                                                                           
 156 See L.A. Mem’l Coliseum, 726 F.2d 1381, 1393 (accepting that the unique nature of NFL foot-
ball suggests that it is itself the relevant product market, as opposed to the broader market for profes-
sional football); Mid-S. Grizzlies, 720 F.2d 772, 783 (citing Mid-S. Grizzlies, 550 F. Supp. at 571 
n.33) (providing that the NFL did not challenge the plaintiff’s position that major league professional 
football was the relevant product market at issue); Lazaroff, supra note 14, at 207–10 (suggesting, 
alternatively, that NFL football is the logical relevant product market due to the lack of close substi-
tutes). Although the plaintiff in Mid-South Grizzlies alleged that the relevant product market was pro-
fessional football, the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit in Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum suggests that 
the court may have accepted the provision of NFL football as a narrower market. Compare L.A. 
Mem’l Coliseum, 726 F.2d 1381, 1393 (weighing the uniqueness of NFL football against other profes-
sional sports and entertainment in franchise cities), with Mid-S. Grizzlies, 720 F.2d at 783 (citing Mid-
S. Grizzlies, 550 F. Supp. at 571 n.33) (noting that the relevant product market was stipulated as major 
league professional football). 
 157 See L.A. Mem’l Coliseum, 726 F.2d 1381, 1394 (concluding that an exact determination of the 
relevant product market was unnecessary if the finder of fact would still be able to weigh the harm to 
competition against the reasonable benefits the challenged policy affords the NFL). Although the 
Ninth Circuit did not see the need to establish a definitive product market, its reasoning suggested that 
it favored the narrower view limited to NFL football. See id. at 1393 (noting that NFL coach Don 
Shula stated that the league had fans distinct from those of college football, pointing to ticket sales 
and television viewership as evidence of limited substitutes); Michael A. McCann, Antitrust, Govern-
ance, and Postseason College Football, 52 B.C. L. REV. 517, 535 & n.113 (2011) (observing the 
narrow construction of product market in NFL antitrust analyses, and applying that reasoning to 
NCAA football). 
 158 See Lazaroff, supra note 14, at 209–10 (denying the proposition that general entertainment 
and other professional sports leagues are acceptable substitutes to fans of the NFL); Barrabi, supra 
note 88 (discussing failed attempts by the XFL, USFL, and UFL to enter the professional football 
market in the United States); Gustkey, supra note 88 (providing an overview of the formation and 
decline of the WFL). Although the Arena Football League is still active, it consists of four teams play-
ing a modified version of football indoors, and it has previously filed for bankruptcy. See Barrabi, 
supra note 88 (providing the history of the Arena Football League). 
 159 See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2284 (2018) (first quoting Copperweld Corp. 
v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984); then quoting Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. 
PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886 (2007)) (stating that a rule of reason analysis considers a challenged 
action’s effect on competition from the perspective of consumers in the relevant market). 
 160 See Cal. Dental Ass’n v. F.T.C., 526 U.S. 756, 782 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (identifying a four-part analytical tree including identifying the restraint and market 
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of determining liability, however, the analysis rests on whether a plaintiff can 
identify anticompetitive effects stemming from being denied entry that would 
outweigh any justifications put forth by the NFL.161 
In Mid-South Grizzlies v. National Football League, the NFL acknowl-
edged that the petitioning franchise met all the qualifications required by the 
NFL Constitution of a franchise applicant.162 In denying the applicant a fran-
chise, the NFL cited pending legislation surrounding television broadcasts, 
collective-bargaining disputes with players, and the scheduling difficulties as-
sociated with having an odd number of teams as its reasonable justification for 
its decision.163 The Mid-South Grizzlies court found the NFL’s justification 
sufficient, as the plaintiff failed to show competitive harm to consumers of 
NFL football, and thus effectively decided the rule of reason test independent 
of alleged anticompetitive intent.164 
                                                                                                                           
power of the defendant); NFL CONST., supra note 6, at art. III § 3.1(B). Independent of whether the 
court defines the relevant product market to include NFL football or the broader provision of profes-
sional football, the history of failure of NFL competitors provides context that the Mid-South Grizzlies 
court lacked in considering rejected expansion as preserving potential future competition. See 720 
F.2d at 786 (casting the NFL’s decision to deny the plaintiff’s expansion bid as procompetitive); Bar-
rabi, supra note 88 (collecting examples of failed football leagues in the United States following the 
merger of the AFL and NFL); Gustkey, supra note 88 (detailing the collapse of the WFL). In effect, 
the market for professional football in the United States has collapsed into the market for NFL foot-
ball, suggesting that the long-term viability of a prospective entrant depends on the three-fourths vote 
of existing NFL franchises. See Barrabi, supra note 88 (suggesting competing with the NFL in the 
provision of professional football is not sustainable); Gustkey, supra note 88 (detailing the WFL’s 
failed attempt at competing with the NFL). 
 161 See Cal. Dental Ass’n, 526 U.S. at 782 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(stating that weighing the resulting anticompetitive effects of an action against the procompetitive 
justifications is central to a rule of reason analysis); Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 768 (stating that a rule of 
reason analysis looks at the net impact of challenged conduct on competition). 
 162 720 F.2d at 786 (citing Mid-S. Grizzlies, 550 F. Supp. at 568). Eligibility of applicants for new 
NFL franchises is set forth in Article III, section 3.2 of the NFL Constitution. NFL CONST., supra 
note 6, at art. III § 3.2. Section 3.2 of the NFL Constitution does not provide any substantive require-
ments for what the NFL sees as a competitive candidate for admission, but rather limits the form of 
entity eligible for membership in the NFL. See id. (identifying the admissible forms of entity for 
membership eligibility). Section 3.3 of the NFL Constitution details the process by which a potential 
franchisee may apply for a new NFL franchise. Id. at art. III § 3.3. Section 3.3 requires that an appli-
cant submit an application along with a fee, financial information on the applicant, and personal and 
financial information of the individuals involved with the applicant. Id. Like section 3.2, section 3.3 
does not provide standards or suggest what the NFL looks for in applicants. See id. at art. III §§ 3.2–.3 
(providing a baseline for what an applicant must do to apply but giving no information on the exami-
nation process of applications). 
 163 Mid-S. Grizzlies, 720 F.2d at 786. 
 164 See L.A. Mem’l Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1395 (citing Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 
U.S 231, 238 (1918)) (stating that it is not enough that conduct is motivated by desire to restrain trade 
if the net harm to competition is outweighed by procompetitive results); Mid-S. Grizzlies, 720 F.2d at 
786–87 (stating that, without a complaint showing harm to competition, the motivation of the NFL in 
denying the plaintiff a franchise was not challengeable under § 1 of the Sherman Act). The rule of 
reason test requires weighing the anticompetitive effects of the challenged act against the procompeti-
tive justifications, so absent allegations of an impact on consumers, a plaintiff must always lose. See 
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Although the plaintiff in Mid-South Grizzlies failed to make the allega-
tions, the court noted that NFL teams compete in the selling of tickets, conces-
sions, merchandise, and local broadcasting rights, each of which could be neg-
atively affected by the NFL’s denial of a franchise applicant in certain regional 
markets.165 Applied in the context of relocation, the court in Los Angeles Me-
morial Coliseum identified similar factors and considered them significant in 
finding that they outweighed the NFL’s interest in controlling the regional dis-
tribution of its teams.166 It seems from these decisions that, despite the NFL 
having legitimate interests in protecting the league and promoting the stability 
of franchises and their ability to compete on the field, the net impact of poli-
cies that limit competition between member teams of the NFL are harmful to 
competition and subject to liability under § 1 of the Sherman Act.167 Therefore, 
in a situation similar to that in Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum, or the applica-
tion for an expansion franchise in the New York Metropolitan area as hypothe-
sized in Mid-South Grizzlies, the rule of reason test suggests possible antitrust 
liability for the NFL.168 
B. The NFL as a Monopoly: A § 2 Challenge 
Given the history of the market for professional football in the United 
States, there is little doubt that the NFL holds a monopoly in the space.169 Alt-
                                                                                                                           
Cal. Dental Ass’n, 526 U.S. at 782 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that a 
rule of reason test requires a weighing of the resulting anticompetitive effects of an action against the 
procompetitive justifications). 
 165 Mid-S. Grizzlies, 720 F.2d at 787. 
 166 See 726 F.2d at 1390 (noting that NFL teams in similar regions compete for fans and media 
revenue). 
 167 See id. at 1391, 1394, 1396 (identifying the legitimate interests the NFL has in enforcing its 
relocation policies and determining that they are not sufficient to justify the resulting limitation of true 
competition between teams); Mid-S. Grizzlies, 720 F.2d at 787 (noting anticompetitive effects of NFL 
policies restricting intra-league competition). 
 168 See L.A. Mem’l Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1401 (holding that the NFL’s relocation voting policy 
was anticompetitive under § 1 of the Sherman Act); Mid-S. Grizzlies, 720 F.2d at 787 (suggesting that 
the NFL’s denial of a franchise expansion application in the New York Metropolitan area would result 
in a decline in intra-league competition, and have a different outcome that the case presented). The 
Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum court additionally noted that just because allowing the entry of a 
competitor may prove fatal for an existing franchise, or even the league, the reality serves as no de-
fense if denying entry has anticompetitive effects. See 726 F.2d at 1395 (citing United States v. Soco-
ny-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221 (1940)) (suggesting that preservation of an established fran-
chise is insufficient to justify restraints). 
 169 See Mid-S. Grizzlies, 720 F.2d at 783 (citing Mid-S. Grizzlies, 550 F. Supp. at 571) (acknowl-
edging that, at the time of the case, the NFL held a monopoly in professional football). Since the deci-
sion in Mid-South Grizzlies, there have been attempts to create competing—and co-existing—
professional football leagues in the United States, which have in each case failed. See Barrabi, supra 
note 88 (detailing unsuccessful attempts by the XFL, USFL, and UFL to establish professional foot-
ball leagues in the United States). During writing of this Note, the market for professional football 
was in a similar position as it was in 1983 when Mid-South Grizzlies was decided, with the NFL as the 
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hough the existence of a monopoly is the foundation of § 2 liability, Mid-South 
Grizzlies provides a strong argument against the applicability of § 2 in a chal-
lenge of the NFL expansion policy.170 
The court in Mid-South Grizzlies highlighted the continuing significance 
of the Sports Broadcasting Act in relation to the NFL’s status and rights as a 
monopoly.171 In passing the Sports Broadcasting Act and allowing the merger 
of the AFL and NFL, the Third Circuit in Mid-South Grizzlies read into the 
statute an implicit acknowledgment by Congress that the resulting NFL would 
have access to advantages not available to its competitors.172 The court noted 
that, were the NFL to use these advantages for the purpose of disadvantaging 
competitor leagues from establishing a place in the market, the league could 
face antitrust liability.173 As applied to granting membership within the mo-
nopoly, however, the court rejected the plaintiff’s contention that the Sports 
Broadcasting Act placed an obligation on the NFL to actively share its market 
power.174 Applying the same reasoning from its rejection of the plaintiff’s § 1 
claim, the court held that, without an immediate showing of anticompetitive 
                                                                                                                           
sole professional football league and attempts to form a new league in progress. See id. (noting that 
the USFL began in 1983 and forecasting the launch of the Alliance of American Football (AAF) and 
revival of the XFL anticipated in 2019 and 2020, respectively). Demonstrating the difficulty of pre-
senting an alternative football league, the AAF announced on March 27, 2019, forty-seven days after 
its debut, that it was at risk of dissolving unless allowed to use young NFL players. See Mike Jones & 
Kevin Allen, Majority Investor: Alliance of American Football in Danger of Being Discontinued 
Without NFLPA Help, USA TODAY (Mar. 27, 2019), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/2019/03/
27/alliance-of-american-football-aaf-tom-dundon-future-nflpa/3287922002/ [https://perma.cc/3UZ8-
CTA9] (reporting that without an agreement with the NFL Players’ Association allowing the fledgling 
league use of NFL players, the AAF may be forced out of business); ALLIANCE OF AM. FOOTBALL, 
https://aaf.com/scores [https://perma.cc/GLU8-SNUV] (memorializing the first game of the league on 
February 9, 2019). On April 17, 2019, the AAF filed for bankruptcy after officially ending operations. 
Michael Rothstein, Shuttered AAF Files for Chapter 7 Bankruptcy, ESPN (Apr. 18, 2019), http://
www.espn.com/espn/story/_/id/26546883/shuttered-aaf-files-chapter-7-bankruptcy [https://perma.cc/
4P2A-NHR6]; AAF Files for Bankruptcy, Officially Closes Down, USA TODAY (Apr. 17, 2019), https://
www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nfl/2019/04/17/aaf-alliance-american-football-files-bankruptcy/35007
08002/ [https://perma.cc/FR4F-SMM2]. The XFL met a similar fate as the AAF, under different cir-
cumstances, filing for bankruptcy on April 13, 2020, after the league debuted in February 2020. See Kev-
in Seifert, XFL Files for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy After Suspending Operations, ESPN (Apr. 13, 2020), 
https://www.espn.com/xfl/story/_/id/29030763/xfl-files-chapter-11-bankruptcy-suspending-operations 
[https://perma.cc/Q934-96EZ] (reporting the bankruptcy filing of the XFL amid the COVID-19 pandem-
ic and suggesting the strong possibility that the league will not resume operations). 
 170 See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (defining liability for monopolization under the Sherman Act); Mid-S. Griz-
zlies, 720 F.2d at 784–85, 788 (discussing the development of the NFL’s monopoly power and inap-
plicability to franchise expansion). 
 171 See Mid-S. Grizzlies, 720 F.2d at 788 (viewing the passage of the Sports Broadcasting Act as a 
congressional grant of monopoly power to the NFL). 
 172 See id. 
 173 See id. at 785 n.7 (noting the antitrust implications of the NFL using the position granted to it 
under the Sports Broadcasting Act to limit competitor leagues). 
 174 See id. at 784–85 (stating the plaintiff’s position and rejecting that they were entitled to a share 
in the NFL’s monopoly under the Sports Broadcasting Act). 
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effects from the denial of a franchise, the NFL was a sanctioned monopoly and 
thus immune from a § 2 challenge.175 
C. Parallel Exclusion Among Individual NFL Franchises 
Although not yet adopted by courts as actionable anticompetitive conduct, 
the NFL expansion rules provide an example of a scenario where parallel ex-
clusion could apply.176 Due to the small number of NFL franchises, the com-
mon benefit that each franchise receives in voting against a new entrant, and 
the low cost of performance, the NFL’s expansion rules provide an ideal set-
ting for parallel exclusion.177 Viewing NFL franchises’ negative vote for a 
franchise expansion as parallel exclusion presents the opportunity to apply the 
goals of U.S. antitrust law at a more granular level, and could establish liability 
where a straightforward application of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act do 
not.178 
1. Parallel Exclusion as an Aid for § 1 Liability 
The largest hurdle that a § 1 challenge of the NFL’s expansion rules is 
likely to face is the determination of whether the applicant’s denial results in 
anticompetitive effects that are greater than the NFL’s procompetitive justifi-
cations.179 Whereas the NFL, when viewed in its entirety as a collection of 
teams, has broad goals and concerns related to the preservation of the league 
and gameplay, each individual franchise has its own private motivations.180 
                                                                                                                           
 175 See id. at 788 (affirming summary judgment against the plaintiff’s § 2 claim). 
 176 See Hemphill & Wu, supra note 9, at 1185 (defining parallel exclusion). 
 177 See id. at 1192, 1210 (providing three criteria that influence the likelihood that parallel exclu-
sion will be used to impact competition in a market); Teams, supra note 5 (identifying the thirty-two 
NFL franchises currently in existence). In the case of the NFL, the cost to each franchise in excluding 
a potential entrant is less than that of those blocking the approval of PVC conduit in Allied Tube & 
Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc. See 486 U.S. 492, 495–97 (1988) (providing an example of when 
exclusion of competition is relatively inexpensive to orchestrate). Each “no” vote costs the casting 
franchise nothing, perhaps with the exception of potential increase in league-wide revenue then sub-
ject to the NFL’s revenue sharing policy. See Bloom, supra note 89 (describing the NFL’s revenue 
sharing system). 
 178 See H.R. REP. NO. 51-1707, at 1 (identifying the objectives of the Sherman Act); Fox, supra 
note 13, at 566–67 (discussing the Supreme Court’s description of the rationales for antitrust laws in 
the United States); The Antitrust Laws, supra note 13 (identifying the consistent purpose of antitrust 
laws in the United States as protecting competition in the interest of consumers). 
 179 See Cal. Dental Ass’n, 526 U.S. at 782 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(breaking the rule of reason test into a four-part inquiry, including weighing the anticompetitive ef-
fects of an action against its procompetitive justifications); Mid-S. Grizzlies, 720 F.2d at 787–88 
(identifying the plaintiff’s lack of a showing of harm to competition as the central reason for adverse 
summary judgment). 
 180 See Am. Needle, 560 U.S. at 196 (noting the nature of each franchise as an independent busi-
ness with objectives separate from those of the greater league); L.A. Mem’l Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 
1389 (stating that, like a cartel, the economic interests of NFL franchises are at times, but not always, 
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Among those motivations is the maximization of profit, which is aided by limi-
tations on intra-league competition.181 Viewing each franchise and its decision 
to vote against expansion individually suggests that the rule of reason balanc-
ing test should apply at the franchise level.182 The question then becomes: are 
there sufficient procompetitive justifications to outweigh each team’s goal to 
preserve its local monopoly?183 
Currently, only two regional markets in the United States contain more 
than one NFL franchise and, therefore, compete directly with another team for 
the local revenue as identified in Mid-South Grizzlies.184 Whereas a significant 
portion of revenue earned by NFL franchises is subject to the league revenue 
sharing agreement, much of the local revenue generated by a franchise is theirs 
                                                                                                                           
in line with those of the league in general). The court in Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum noted that 
certain interests of franchise owners, such as protecting the “integrity” of the NFL, were shared at the 
league level, whereas coordination to segment and control territories instead benefits the individual 
members. See 726 F.2d at 1391–92 (comparing legitimate interests of the NFL with illegitimate inter-
ests of cartels engaged in anticompetitive conduct). The existence of a corporate office, separate from 
the management bodies of each individual franchise, further supports the distinction between interests 
of the NFL and those of the individual franchises. See NFL CONST., supra note 6, at arts. II, VIII 
(establishing an independent commissioner whose job includes managing the “purposes and objects” 
of the league, and separately, the business of league members). 
 181 See Am. Needle, 560 U.S. at 197–98 (identifying NFL franchises as profit-maximizing with 
interests separate from those common to the league in general); L.A. Mem’l Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 
1395 (stating that NFL franchises compete with each other, and explaining that exclusive territories 
granted by NFL rules give franchises monopoly power that harms consumers); Mid-S. Grizzlies, 720 
F.2d at 786–87 (listing ticket sales, local broadcast rights, and sale of concessions and licensed team 
items as potential sources of competition between NFL franchises). 
 182 See Am. Needle, 560 U.S. at 196 (recognizing the individual motivations of the NFL member 
franchises, separate from those of the league). 
 183 See Cal. Dental Ass’n, 526 U.S. at 782 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(discussing the necessary weighing of pro- and anticompetitive effects of challenged conduct in a rule 
of reason test); Hemphill & Wu, supra note 9, at 1198–99 (discussing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 
550 U.S. 544 (2007) as an example of parallel exclusion enacted by regional monopolies). In 
Twombly, the plaintiffs alleged that components of the former AT&T monopoly behaved in an anti-
competitive manner in agreeing not to do business in the territories of the other components and in 
agreeing to exclude competitors from each territory. 550 U.S. at 551, 566. Although the Court deter-
mined that the plaintiff failed to plead with sufficient specificity as to make allegations of parallel 
exclusion plausible, its hesitation in finding that acts of the AT&T components to be anticompetitive 
and illegal rested in the fact that the alleged “parallel conduct” consisted of ordinary efforts to resist 
competition in a marketplace. Id. at 566, 570.  
 184 See Mid-S. Grizzlies, 720 F.2d at 786–87 (listing potential sources of competition between 
NFL franchises in the same regional market). Only Los Angeles and New York City are home to 
multiple NFL franchises. Teams, supra note 5 (listing the Los Angeles Chargers, Los Angeles Rams, 
New York Giants and New York Jets as current NFL franchises). Although the San Francisco Bay 
area has traditionally been home to both the San Francisco 49ers and the Oakland Raiders, the Raid-
ers’ move to Las Vegas to begin the 2020 season ends the regional competition. Tadd Haislop, Raid-
ers’ Move to Las Vegas: Why (and When) Oakland’s NFL Team Is Leaving for New Stadium, SPORT-
ING NEWS (Dec. 15, 2019), https://www.sportingnews.com/us/nfl/news/raiders-move-las-vegas-new-
stadium/421klqekch1t1cu0h56zcqew2 [https://perma.cc/AC52-BYVD]. 
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alone.185 This reality places each franchise in a prisoner’s dilemma, as theo-
rized by Professors Hemphill and Wu, with the dominant strategy being exclu-
sion, particularly for markets that could support a new franchise.186 
The practical effect of a new franchise entering the NFL is an immediate 
impact on the revenue sharing model.187 Once a franchise is established, it be-
comes party to the revenue sharing system, and each team’s percentage of the 
shared pot decreases.188 If the new team is located within the local market of 
an established team, increased competition for fans, ticket sales, and other reve-
nue not subject to the revenue sharing agreement introduces elements of market 
forces previously absent from a monopolized market.189 In voting on approval of 
an expansion team, representatives of each franchise are inevitably motivated by 
the business interests of maximizing their shared and individually earned reve-
nue, and perhaps, the maintenance of their franchise’s resale value.190 
The structure of the NFL supports that there is an incentive for NFL fran-
chises to restrict entry into the league, resulting in parallel anticompetitive 
conduct when the decision is left to a three-fourths vote.191 If accepted, the 
                                                                                                                           
 185 See Feldman, supra note 90, at 889 (describing revenue sharing as a system, including typical 
sources of shared revenue and sources that are traditionally independently retained); Piraino, supra 
note 78, at 1700 n.107 (citing Jacobs, supra note 90, at 31 n.27) (detailing the distribution of gate 
revenues for NFL teams); Bloom, supra note 89 (discussing revenue sharing in the context of the 
NFL). 
 186 See Hemphill & Wu, supra note 9, at 1232 (discussing parallel exclusion as a dominant strate-
gy in a prisoner’s dilemma). 
 187 See Feldman, supra note 90, at 889 (discussing revenue sharing); Bloom, supra note 89 (dis-
cussing the revenue sharing system of the NFL and the sources of shared revenue). 
 188 See Bloom, supra note 89 (noting NFL teams share a large portion of their revenue). As an 
example, the estimate for the NFL’s 2017 shared revenue is more than $8 billion, with each of the 
thirty-two teams receiving approximately $255 million. Report: NFL Teams’ Revenue Share Topped $8 
Billion in 2017, supra note 88. If the league expanded to include one more team, each team’s revenue 
share from the same year would have been reduced by approximately $13 million (assuming total league 
revenue remained flat). See id. (providing the revenue sharing figures for a thirty-two-team league). If the 
league expanded to include two more teams—for a total of thirty-four—individual team revenue would 
decrease by nearly $20 million (assuming total league revenue remained flat). See id. (same). Expansion 
fees imposed on any new franchise joining the NFL would offset, in part, the reduction in revenue shar-
ing totals for established teams. See NFL Expansion Fees, PRO FOOTBALL HALL OF FAME (Jan. 1, 
2005), https://www.profootballhof.com/news/nfl-expansion-fees/ [https://perma.cc/2SM9-5XPN] 
(listing franchise fees paid by new franchises joining the NFL since 1925). 
 189 See Mid-S. Grizzlies, 720 F.2d at 786–87 (listing potential sources of competition between 
NFL franchises); Feldman, supra note 90, at 889 (discussing what is, and is not, included in revenue 
sharing systems). 
 190 See Mid-S. Grizzlies, 720 F.2d at 786–87 (listing potential sources of competition that could 
be triggered by the entrance of an new franchise into the regional market of an existing NFL team); 
Feldman, supra note 90, at 889 (discussing the sources of revenue included in a revenue sharing sys-
tem versus those retained by independent members of professional sports leagues); see also Piraino, 
supra note 78, at 1684 (noting that an additional relevant market implicated by NFL expansion rules is 
that for the sale and resale of professional sports franchises). 
 191 See Mid-S. Grizzlies, 720 F.2d at 786–87 (identifying potential sources of competition be-
tween NFL franchises that many teams currently do not face); Feldman, supra note 90, at 889 (dis-
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theory of parallel exclusion provides a means by which courts could look di-
rectly at the interests of the individual franchises that participate in the voting, 
rather than considering a justification put forth by the NFL that masks individ-
ual intent with purported league-wide interests that may be easily fabricated.192 
2. Parallel Exclusion and § 2 of the Sherman Act 
Under the analysis theorized in the preceding Subsection, it was pre-
sumed that requiring procompetitive justifications at the franchise level would 
preserve the NFL Constitution as the requisite agreement for § 1 liability.193 As 
proposed by Professors Hemphill and Wu, a benefit of parallel exclusion as 
actionable anticompetitive conduct is that it recognizes that coordination by 
firms can simulate monopoly power without the existence of a single dominant 
presence.194 As a result, if the presumption of agreement were to fail, parallel 
exclusion may be captured under § 2 of the Sherman Act, which targets con-
duct that otherwise escapes antitrust liability.195 In applying the theory of par-
                                                                                                                           
cussing the system of revenue sharing that would be affected by the entrance of a new member in the 
NFL); NFL CONST., supra note 6, at art. III § 3.3(C) (providing that, to be admitted to the NFL, an 
applicant franchise must receive the affirmative vote of three-fourths of the then member franchises). 
 192 See L.A. Mem’l Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1396 (pointing to the NFL’s overall rationale for its 
relocation policy, not those of the individual teams that the policy was found to protect); Mid-S. Griz-
zlies, 720 F.2d at 786 (providing the NFL’s justifications for rejecting the expansion franchise, not 
looking to other potential motivations of existing members). An additional interest that may motivate 
NFL franchises in excluding new teams mirrors an allegation made in Twombly that if one expansion 
franchise were to gain entry and succeed, it might lay the path for other new teams to enter at the 
expense of the current franchises. See 550 U.S. at 566 (acknowledging the allegation that the entry by 
one competitor into the regional monopoly of one AT&T spinoff could increase competition in other 
locations). The Twombly Court ultimately rejected this line of argument, as it identified the behavior 
of the defendants to be in line with the reasonable desire of members of a market to not aid competi-
tors. Id. A factual difference that perhaps aids this allegation in the context of NFL franchise expan-
sion is that, unlike policies implemented by the defendants in Twombly that resist competition, NFL 
franchises acting in unison are able to completely deny entry to the market. See id. (finding that poli-
cies to resist competition were reasonable in a marketplace). 
 193 See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (requiring an agreement between parties for antitrust liability); L.A. Mem’l 
Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1387 (stating that the NFL Constitution formed an agreement sufficient for 
liability under § 1 of the Sherman Act). 
 194 See Hemphill & Wu supra note 9, at 1236–37 (stating that parallel exclusion fits well under 
§ 2 of the Sherman Act, as “shared monopol[ies]” may result in the same exclusionary impact as a 
single monopoly engaged in anticompetitive conduct). 
 195 See id. at 1239 (citing Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911)) (iden-
tifying the purpose of § 2 of the Sherman Act as expanding liability and suggesting that the theory of 
parallel exclusion is consistent with the goal of targeting substance over form). It seems unlikely that a 
court would find that a § 1 analysis, influenced by the principles of parallel exclusion, would lack an 
agreement necessary for liability. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (requiring an agreement between parties for anti-
trust liability). Although excluding the NFL as a larger institution for the weighing of pro- and anti-
competitive results looks at the level below the NFL as an entity, and therefore the level below the 
NFL Constitution, the role of the document in granting member franchises the ability to vote on, and 
theoretically exclude, new franchises retains the significance of the agreement. See NFL CONST., 
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allel exclusion to NFL franchises, absent the sanctioned monopoly granted to 
the NFL under the Sports Broadcasting Act, it is possible to view the collection 
of teams as a “shared monopoly.”196 Viewing the individual NFL franchises as 
composing a shared monopoly based on their actions, rather than through par-
ticipation in the NFL, the Sports Broadcasting Act’s sanctioned monopoly ap-
pears to be less protective of the teams’ actions.197 
Under the shared monopoly approach, Professors Hemphill and Wu pro-
pose a three-part test to determine whether participants should be liable for 
anticompetitive exclusion.198 First, does the combination result in sufficient 
simulated monopoly power to create anticompetitive effects?199 Second, does 
the challenged behavior limit entrance of competitors with the result of harm-
ing competition?200 Finally, is the behavior justified, such that it produces a 
result that is net beneficial?201 When applied to the shared monopoly created 
by the aggregation of NFL member franchises, there is monopoly power and 
limitation on entry.202 The remaining questions seem to reflect a rule of reason 
analysis weighing the procompetitive justifications of an action against the 
anticompetitive effects, which would be very difficult for the NFL franchises 
to win in many scenarios, as an individual team owner’s negative vote for the 
protection of their franchise value lacks any procompetitive angle.203 
                                                                                                                           
supra note 6, at art. III § 3.3(C) (providing that admission to the NFL requires an applicant franchise 
to receive the affirmative vote of three-fourths of the then member franchises). 
 196 See Hemphill & Wu supra note 9, at 1296–97 (defining collective action by independent 
firms, with the result of excluding competitors, as a “shared monopoly”). 
 197 See Mid-S. Grizzlies, 720 F.2d at 784, 788 (noting that the Sports Broadcasting Act granted 
the NFL its market power and stating that the plaintiff could not challenge that grant, not that the 
individual NFL teams held any right to a monopoly). As an additional argument, the Sports Broad-
casting Act, as applicable to the NFL and its grant of market power resulting from the merger of the 
AFL and NFL, legalized agreements between member teams of professional football leagues subject 
to certain income tax exemptions. 15 U.S.C. § 1291. As of 2015, the NFL abandoned its status as a 
tax-free entity, suggesting that the 1966 amendment to the Sports Broadcasting Act no longer has 
relevance to the NFL or its member teams. See Dubin, supra note 86 (providing a memorandum from 
the NFL commissioner to league members detailing the abandonment of tax-free status). 
 198 See Hemphill & Wu, supra note 9, at 1237–38 (detailing the three-step analysis). 
 199 Id. at 1237. 
 200 Id. at 1238. 
 201 Id. 
 202 See Mid-S. Grizzlies, 720 F.2d at 783 (citing Mid-S. Grizzlies, 550 F. Supp. at 571) (acknowl-
edging that at the time of the case the NFL held a monopoly in professional football, which presumes 
that the individual teams share in that power); NFL CONST., supra note 6, at art. III (granting the 
power to include, and therefore exclude, expansion franchises solely to member franchises of the 
NFL). 
 203 See Cal. Dental Ass’n, 526 U.S. at 782 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(identifying the components of a rule of reason test); L.A. Mem’l Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1395 (giving 
deciding weight to the anticompetitive effect of excluding a team from an occupied market due to the 
harm to competitive pricing); Mid-S. Grizzlies, 720 F.2d at 787 (suggesting that the court might come 
to a different decision had the plaintiff presented examples of intra-league competition harmed by the 
denial of their expansion franchise). 
2020] NFL Expansion Policy Under Antitrust Law 2223 
III. THE NFL’S EXPANSION POLICY IS ANTICOMPETITIVE 
The stated goal of the Sherman Act is to prevent restriction of commerce 
for the benefit and protection of consumers.204 Under this law, the NFL’s ex-
pansion policy—leaving the decision of whether to admit or deny a new fran-
chise to existing owners—is anticompetitive.205 The structure of the NFL ex-
pansion voting rules leaves the decision of whether a competitor should be al-
lowed to enter the market for NFL football—and therefore professional foot-
ball—solely to those parties that benefit from the exclusion of competition.206 
Given the proper challenge, the laws in place provide the means for a rejected 
NFL franchise applicant to successfully challenge its denial.207 Furthermore, if 
the courts take the goals of antitrust law seriously, they should adopt the theory 
of parallel exclusion in cases where the established analytical structure allows 
anticompetitive conduct outside the forms required under §§ 1 and 2 of the 
Sherman Act, resulting in a substantial harm to consumers.208 
A. No Sufficient Justification Under a § 1 Rule of Reason Test 
Absent a transparent set of narrowly tailored, objective guidelines put forth 
by the NFL dictating what the criteria are for the acceptance of an expansion 
franchise, any rejection under the current rules raises anticompetitive flags.209 In 
                                                                                                                           
 204 See H.R. REP. NO. 51-1707, at 1 (identifying the objectives of the Sherman Act). 
 205 See Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (2018) (providing that anticompetitive conduct, 
through agreement or attempts at monopolization, is illegal); NFL CONST., supra note 6, at art. III 
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 207 See L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 726 F.2d 1381, 1395–96, 1401 
(9th Cir. 1984) (holding that the justifications put forth by the NFL, although valid, were not sufficient 
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Mid-S. Grizzlies v. Nat’l Football League, 720 F.2d 772, 787 (3d Cir. 1983) (leaving the door open to 
an NFL expansion challenge resulting from an applicant’s denial from an occupied market). 
 208 See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 550–51 (2007) (alleging parallel exclusion by 
surviving companies of the AT&T regulatory breakup in implementing uniform policies to exclude 
competitors from each region). Although the Twombly Court correctly restated the plaintiff’s claims, 
they failed to treat parallel exclusion as unique, actionable, anticompetitive conduct. See Hemphill & 
Wu, supra note 9, at 1199 (concluding that Twombly presents, but then does not address, the theory of 
parallel exclusion, and it has not therefore been denied as a potential antitrust doctrine). 
 209 See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (making agreements with the result of restraining trade illegal); L.A. Mem’l 
Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1397 (suggesting that when the NFL enacts a policy to protect its interests as a 
league, adoption of a set of objective standards would provide a stronger defense against antitrust 
liability). As it stands, the Ninth Circuit determined the NFL Constitution is a sufficient agreement to 
subject NFL expansion decisions to antitrust liability under § 1 of the Sherman Act. See L.A. Mem’l 
Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1387 (accepting that the NFL Constitution was an agreement as required under 
§ 1 of the Sherman Act). Further, the NFL easily meets the market power analysis required under a 
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both Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. National Football League 
and Mid-South Grizzlies v. National Football League, the courts either held or 
suggested that a showing of direct harm to consumers was sufficient to outweigh 
the NFL’s proposed justifications.210 Although harm to consumers was held to 
include monopolistic prices encouraged by controlling the number of franchises 
in a market, the Mid-South Grizzlies court’s finding that there was no competi-
tion among existing teams in vacant markets, resulting in harm to consumers, is 
unconvincing.211 Consumers of NFL football live across the United States, not 
only in cities or regions in which franchises are based.212 Limiting the ability of 
a new franchise to enter an unoccupied region, therefore, prevents a team from 
entering the market and providing NFL football to a base of customers that have 
shown interest in the product, but for whom access is artificially directed.213 Be-
cause customers of each NFL franchise exist outside the regional markets of 
each team, and their allegiances—and corresponding dollars—are funneled to 
existing teams due to artificial restriction of a more local provider, intra-league 
competition is limited.214 The direct effect of the limitation is the same as that 
identified in Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum.215 Mainly, that existing NFL fran-
chises retain monopoly power to set prices.216 Presumably, competition between 
                                                                                                                           
rule of reason test. See Cal. Dental Ass’n v. F.T.C., 526 U.S. 756, 782 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring 
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 210 See L.A. Mem’l Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1395–96, 1401 (finding that the anticompetitive harms 
of the NFL relocation policy outweighed legitimate concerns of the NFL in controlling franchise relo-
cation); Mid-S. Grizzlies, 720 F.2d at 786–87 (stating that, despite the NFL’s reasons for rejecting the 
plaintiff’s franchise, a showing of intra-league competition that was restrained by the NFL’s expan-
sion policy could result in a different analysis and outcome). 
 211 See L.A. Mem’l Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1395 (holding that restricting a team from relocating 
into an occupied territory synthetically restricted competition and gave the occupying team a monopo-
ly in the region); Mid-S. Grizzlies, 720 F.2d at 787 (stating that the record failed to present evidence 
that a franchise in Memphis would compete in any way with established NFL teams for the benefit of 
consumers). 
 212 See SeatGeek & Priceonomics, Here’s Where Each NFL Team Is Most Popular in America, 
Mapped, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 7, 2018), https://www.businessinsider.com/where-nfl-teams-most-popular-
map-of-america-2018-10 [https://perma.cc/4MR2-TCTR] (providing a map of the United States 
showing what the most popular NFL team is in any given county). 
 213 See id. (showing that consumers of NFL football in regions where there is no local team sup-
port existing franchises in other locations). 
 214 See Mid-S. Grizzlies, 720 F.2d at 786 (requiring that a challenge to the NFL expansion policy 
show an injury to intra-league competition); SeatGeek & Priceonomics, supra note 212 (showing that 
fans of NFL football in regions without a local team support, and likely spend on, existing franchises 
in other locations). 
 215 See L.A. Mem’l Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1395 (finding that the lack of local competition created 
by the NFL’s relocation policy grants monopoly power to established teams to the detriment of con-
sumers). 
 216 See id. (including price control as an effect of monopoly power resulting from artificially 
depressed competition). 
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an existing franchise and a new entrant, although not necessarily impactful on 
fans in the home cities, will increase efforts to attract fans in neutral geographic 
areas for the benefit of all.217 
B. The Sports Broadcasting Act Should Not Shield the  
NFL from Anticompetitive Conduct 
A major argument in the court’s decision in Mid-South Grizzlies relied on 
the conclusion that the Sports Broadcasting Act was a Congressional grant of 
monopoly power.218 This reading, however, appears to ignore the express lan-
guage of the Sports Broadcasting Act, and is even less relevant following the 
NFL’s abandonment of its tax-free status.219 Although the Sports Broadcasting 
Act immunized the NFL from liability under § 2 of the Sherman Act when it 
sought to merge with the AFL, the language of the statute limits the exception 
to broadcasting and mergers, not exclusion.220 As a result, it is reasonable to 
presume that the current NFL is subject to liability for monopolistic behavior, 
and the Sports Broadcasting Act cannot serve as a shield from § 1 liability.221 
With no statutory exemption, the NFL should be subject to antitrust liability 
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tions to antitrust laws for the NFL); Mid-S. Grizzlies, 720 F.2d at 784 (noting that the Sports Broad-
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under § 1 of the Sherman Act). 
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when its conduct results in harm to consumers, which occurs when the fran-
chises hold monopoly power due to artificial restrictions of entry.222 
C. Courts Should Adopt Parallel Exclusion as a  
Method of Antitrust Analysis 
As an analytical tool, the theory of parallel exclusion allows courts to 
look past the form of anticompetitive conduct to the actual effect it has on the 
intended beneficiary of U.S. antitrust laws: the consumer.223 When multiple 
actors engage in parallel conduct encouraged by their individual interests, such 
as the decision by NFL franchises to vote against new entrants to preserve in-
flated profits, consumers may experience anticompetitive effects.224 The exist-
ence of a rule of reason test, which should still apply to identified parallel ex-
clusion, provides some protection to alleged excluders, as it still requires a 
weighing of procompetitive justifications.225 The hole in antitrust coverage that 
allows parallel excluders to restrict competition and avoid liability, solely be-
cause they do not form an agreement or have individual monopolies, is adverse 
to the goal of protecting consumers and must be corrected.226 
CONCLUSION 
The NFL’s policy of leaving the decision of whether to admit expansion 
franchises to a vote of existing member teams is anticompetitive and warrants 
liability under the Sherman Act. The parallel exclusion of new franchises cre-
ates a monopolistic environment for each existing franchise, granting protec-
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tion from true competition and allowing inflated prices and no incentive to im-
prove their product. Although these policies are excellent for business, they 
harm the consuming public in violation of the Sherman Act. For the NFL to 
defend its policy there must be stated, objective standards defining what is re-
quired for admission to the league, with the effect on consumers at the fore-
front. 
In the event the court’s view on expansion remains consistent with the 
decision in Mid-South Grizzlies, applicant franchises should be encouraged to 
follow the path to admission suggested by the Third Circuit. Application to an 
occupied market that has the means to support another franchise creates com-
petition with the incumbent(s) for the benefit of consumers. The new franchise 
may then either remain in the target market or move elsewhere, with the 
knowledge that Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum held NFL relocation re-
strictions anticompetitive, and unenforceable. 
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